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Abstract 
The objective of the present study was to examine 1) the differential third-
person perception (TPP) of the opinion poll reports and 2) whether and how the TPP is 
associated with its consequences -- attitude change and behavioral intention change.  As 
the method, an experiment was conducted with a 2 (message position: pro-restriction vs. 
anti-restriction) by 2 (subject position: pro-restriction vs. anti-restriction) by 2 (others: 
in-group/out-group) mixed factorial design with message position and subject position 
as between-subjects factors and others as a within-subjects factor.  The stimuli were 
news articles reporting the results of an opinion poll on the government restrictions on 
violent TV programming.   
The findings demonstrate participants’ attitude toward the government 
restrictions on violent TV programming changed after they read the news report of 
opinion poll results.  Regarding the differential TPP, message position and others 
interacted with each other on the TPP of the poll results although the predicted 3-way 
interaction among message position, subject position, and others was not statistically 
significant.  Regarding the association between TPP and its consequences -- attitudinal 
change and behavioral intention change, the TPP was significantly associated with the 
attitudinal change, and anxiety mediated the association.  However, the TPP was not 
associated with behavioral intention.   
The present study contributes to the TPE research by revealing the role of 
anxiety as a mediator in the linkage between the TPP and attitudinal change and 
confirming that people’s predisposition on a message and its target group affects the 
perceived effect of the message.  For future research, more studies examining the TPE 
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in diverse contexts with different types and levels of involvement and different types of 
emotion are suggested.    
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Introduction 
Mass media are our means of contact with unseen environments, leading to a 
perception of the outer world that people have not individually experienced (Lippmann, 
1922).  In that individual experience is limited to individual boundaries of life, the 
media help people determine their perception of collective experience outside their 
boundaries (Mutz, 1998).  Thus, Tocqueville (2004) contends the media is a “light” that 
guides wandering minds in darkness to meet and unite with each other (p. 213).  This 
function of media to aggregate individual experiences and opinions on particular issues 
endowed the media with the power to exert influences on people’s perception of public 
opinion, directly or indirectly, intentionally or unintentionally.  For example, those who 
perceive favorable media coverage of a policy tend to see public opinion as supportive 
of the policy, whereas those who perceive unfavorable coverage are more likely to infer 
negative public opinion of the policy (Ball-Rokeach & DeFleur, 1976).   
Furthermore, individuals’ perception of media influence is related with their 
perception of public opinion.  For example, pro-Israeli and pro-Palestinian partisans 
believed media coverage of the war in Lebanon in 1982 would cause neutral viewers to 
become more unfavorable toward their own side and more favorable toward their 
antagonists, thus public opinion would move against their own side (Perloff, 1989).  
That is, individuals’ perception that the media has influences on the public opinion 
influences their perception of the public opinion.       
Media influence on public opinion is widely recognized, and people believe the 
media is “very influential” (Ball-Rokeach & DeFleur, 1976; Meirick, 2006; Price, 
Huang, & Tewksbury, 1997).  While the ‘hypodermic needle’ theory of media effects 
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was abandoned long ago in academia, people continue to perceive that the media has 
direct, usually menacing effects on their audience (Ball-Rokeach & Defleur, 1976; Ball-
Rokeach, 2001).  The media has been accused of being biased, violent, sensational, and 
too commercial at every stage of its development largely because people feared it would 
influence the public (Starker, 1989).  Given decades of research indicating rather 
inconclusive results regarding the direct effect of the media (Ball-Rokeach & Defleur, 
1976; Hetsroni, 2007; McGuire, 1986), people’s estimation of the magnitude of media 
influence on the public seems to be based more on their concerns than on empirical 
evidence.   
Interestingly, people are less likely to perceive that they are influenced by the 
media than to believe the media exerts influence on others who are different from them.  
The third-person effect (TPE) hypothesis addresses the tendency for individuals to 
perceive a greater media impact on others than themselves – the third-person perception 
– and the consequences of this perception (Davison, 1983).  According to the 
hypothesis, those who believe others will be affected by a mediated message take 
actions in response to this belief.  In other words, the perception that the media 
influences others has impacts on individual decisions or behaviors on related social and 
political issues or events.  In this sense, the TPE has significantly contributed to the 
media effect research by providing a “dramatically different” approach to the topic from 
previous approaches that focused on either passive or active impacts of mass media 
(Perloff, 1989, p. 236).  A plethora of studies in diverse contexts have confirmed the 
self-other perceptual gap in terms of media influence (Perloff, 1989, 1993, 2002; Sun, 
Pan, & Shen, 2008).           
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The TPE is important in the study of public opinion because the perceived 
media influence on others can influence public opinion.  Previous TPE research 
indicates the perceptual gap of media influence on others and self – the third-person 
perception – results in behavioral outcomes (Gunther, Perloff, & Tsfati, 2008).  For 
example, when individuals perceive undesirable effects of a mediated message on other 
people, they will increase their support for censorship or some other restrictions on the 
message (Eveland & McLeod, 1999; Salwen & Dupagne, 1999).  These individual 
opinions are aggregated to form the public opinion that will be “measured by opinion 
polls or deduced from media coverage” (Kepplinger, 2008, p. 197).  In this way, 
perceived media influence on public opinion can affect the public opinion itself.  
Nonetheless, research on the behavioral component of the TPE – the relationship 
between the third-person perception and its behavioral consequences -- has yielded 
mixed results (Salwen & Dupagne, 1999; Sun, Shen, & Pan, 2008).  Hence, the current 
study aims to examine the behavioral component of the TPE in the context of news 
coverage of public opinion polls. 
Public opinion polls play an important role in modern politics, representing 
quantified public opinion (Herbst, 1993, 1998; Traugott & Lavrakas, 2008).  News 
reports of polling results are one of the main sources people use to formulate their 
“opinions about the opinion of the majority” (Kepplinger, 2008, p. 199).  People’s 
perception of the public opinion through opinion polls, in turn, becomes the basis for 
their social and political judgments (Davison, 1958; Mutz, 1998).  Government and 
politicians employ opinion polling, as an instrument to gauge public opinion, in the 
decision making process (Eisinger, 2008).  Political behaviors, such as funding for 
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candidates and support for particular public policies, are also influenced by opinion poll 
results (de Vreese & Semetko, 2002; Klotzer, 2008; Price & Stroud, 2006). 
Furthermore, based on the TPE hypothesis, it can be predicted how people 
perceive the effects from media coverage of opinion polls will affect their attitudes 
and/or behaviors (de Vreese & Semetko, 2002; Lang & Lang, 1984; Pan, Abisaid, Paek, 
Sun, & Houden, 2006).  For example, politicians and their aides often take actions 
according to the perceived effects of poll results (Mutz, 1998).  Despite its importance, 
however, the perceived effects of news reports of opinion polls have not been studied 
much until recently (Pan et al., 2006).  Thus, the current study will examine individuals’ 
perceptions of the effects of news coverage of opinion poll results and how these 
perceptions are related to the individuals’ attitudes and behavioral intention.  
In addition, emotion is examined as a mediator in the relationship between the 
third-person perception and its behavioral outcome.  Previous research has 
demonstrated emotions elicited after the exposure to mediated messages have influences 
on cognition and behaviors (Kepplinger, 2008; Nabi, 2003; Roseman & Smith, 2001).  
Negative emotion, particularly anxiety, leads to systematic information seeking and 
active participation in elections (Marcus, Neuman, & Mackuen, 2000).  This anxiety 
might motivate those who have the third-person perception to take actions in response 
to the perception.  However, no previous study has examined the role of emotion in the 
TPE.  Gunther and Thorson (1992) studied how people perceive the effect of an 
emotional advertisement on others and self, but the focus of the study was not the role 
of emotion per se but the perceived effect of the advertisement of which positivity was 
drawn from emotional appeal.  As there have not been any studies regarding the role of 
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emotion in the TPE process, the exploration of whether and how anxiety functions in 
the TPE process should contribute to the TPE research.  
 In the following section, previous studies regarding 1) the effects of news 
coverage of opinion polls on public opinion, 2) the third-person perception and its 
consequences, and 3) the role of emotion in the relationship between the third-person 
perception and its behavioral outcome are reviewed.  Based on these previous studies, 
the relationships among the perceived effect of news reports of opinion polls, factors of 
the third-person perception, the behavioral outcome of the perception, and emotional 
reactions to the perception are hypothesized.           
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Literature Review 
Public Opinion Polls 
Public opinion.  The concept of public opinion originates from the idea of 
“popular rule” in the political philosophy of ancient Greece (Price, 1992, p. 5).  
Aristotle asserted the collective sentiments of people on public affairs provide the basis 
for judgment on the affairs (Minar, 1960).  In the Aristotelian view, the notion of public 
opinion is valuable only when individual interests are filtered out through the process of 
deliberation – discussion and consideration among the entire members of the public 
(Minar, 1960).  That is, he viewed public opinion in terms of collective interests rather 
than a mere collection of individual interests.  
On the other hand, the modern idea of public opinion in line with the Utilitarian 
views stresses individual interests.  The idea of public opinion as an aggregate of 
individual interests with the notion of its formal political role in government was 
established in the late 18th and early 19th centuries by Mill, Locke, Hobbes, and 
Bentham (Price, 1992).  These scholars argued people behave primarily to satisfy their 
individual desires and avoid pain.  The public consists of these individuals seeking to 
maximize their own interests.  The Utilitarian individualists argue individual interests 
should be directly reflected in public policy through legislative devices that harmonize 
the disparate interests of individuals and maximize individual influences.  Although 
public opinion as the vessel of the diverse interests of the individuals in the society is 
valued as the key component of politics, the individualist perspective also recognizes 
“the interplay of interests and the peaceable solution of conflicts of interest” are the 
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function of politics (Minar, 1960, p. 36).  Thus, public opinion is a collective resolution 
of problems through individuals’ arguments and counterarguments.   
This position characterizes the contemporary viewpoint on public opinion.  It is 
also the rationale that underlies the modern effort toward the quantification of public 
opinion through the advisory poll and the referendum as “legislative devices that 
maximize and simplify” the influence of individual interests on public policy (Minar, 
1960, p. 37).  For politicians and government officials, this quantified public opinion is 
an important standard in their decision making process:  
Politicians may use polls to consult the votes about their approval ratings and to 
assess the impact of their political decisions on voting intentions.  However, 
they also use survey data to specify the top issues which the electorate expects 
them to concentrate on while in office.  As a general rule, public policymakers, 
both those who are elected and the bureaucrats, identify public expectations and 
preferences before they set the agenda for social policy to determine the extent 
of popular support for policy options.  The reactions of the public are also 
collected when initiatives are being designed to communicate policy and to test 
public acceptance of these policies. (Butler, 2007, p. 108) 
Public opinion is a very complicated and dynamic concept “always evolving, 
always somehow elusive” (Herbst, 2001, p. 451) largely because the composition of the 
public changes depending on agenda and historical context (Glynn, Herbst, O’Keefe, 
Shapiro, & Lindeman, 2004).  Furthermore, the public changes its size and composition 
throughout the phases of development of public opinion, in which an issue is first 
recognized, disputed, and eventually resolved (Davison, 1958).  According to Davison 
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(1958), in the development of public opinion, a few people first recognize a problem, 
and then the number of people who eventually participate in resolving it grows.  The 
public also changes in composition, expanding from those most directly involved in 
defining and framing the issue to many others who simply follow the issue.  This 
fluidity of the public makes it difficult to identify the public opinion precisely.  The 
nature of a changing and amorphous entity impeded systematic empirical study of 
public opinion until the advent of opinion polling in the mid 1930s (Butler, 2007). 
Role of public opinion polls.  According to Bryce, a nineteenth-century theorist 
of American democracy, the opinion of the common man and that of the elite should be 
of equal weight in true democracy and “the will of the majority of citizens” should be 
learned by some means “without the need of passing through a body of representatives, 
possibly without the need of voting machinery at all” (as cited in Lewis, 2001, p. 25).  
Opinion polls are one of the most frequently employed devices in modern democratic 
society to learn the opinion of citizens.  Although George Gallup is generally 
considered as the pioneer in systematic opinion polling, the origin of opinion polling 
goes back to 1824 when the Harrisburg Pennsylvanian conducted a public opinion 
survey on preferences of presidential candidates (Butler, 2007; Higgins, 2008).  In 
addition, other American newspapers, such as Boston Globe, the New York Herald, the 
Cincinnati Enquirer, the Columbus Dispatch, the Chicago American, and the Chicago 
Record-Herald, conducted public opinion surveys and published the results as a way of 
providing more nonpartisan, objective assessments of aggregate opinion on voting 
preferences and public issues such as the declaration of war on Germany (Gallup & Rae, 
1940).   
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These early public opinion surveys did not employ a systematic survey method 
with a probability sample but used a survey method called a “straw poll.”  The 
newspapers asked the reader to cut out a survey form, “straw ballots,” from the 
newspaper itself and mail the completed form to the sponsoring organization (Butler, 
2007, p. 35; Gallup & Rae, 1940, p. 37).  This method without consideration of the 
consequences of the measurement error was used until 1936 when the Literary Digest 
failed in its Presidential election forecast (Butler, 2007; Traugott & Lavrakas, 2008).  
The telephone-automobile owner list used in the survey was not representative of the 
American voters but biased towards a rich population.  As a result, the forecast failed in 
predicting the victory of the incumbent Franklin D. Roosevelt (Gallup & Rae, 1940).  In 
the same year Gallup applied a systematic quota sampling method to his national survey 
and made an accurate prediction, although this method was not probability sampling 
either (Butler, 2007; Traugott & Lavrakas, 2008).  Probability sampling is based on 
random sampling, which allows for the calculation of sampling error.  Thus, probability 
sampling is considered more accurate although it is more complicated and has higher 
cost.  Some scholars even argue “a survey is not a survey when it does not involve a 
probability sample” (Traugott & Lavrakas, 2008, p. 5).   
In spite of the dispute over the methodology, the role of opinion polling in 
politics has been publicly recognized with the widespread news coverage of opinion 
polls.  Traugott and Lavrakas (2008) contend a symbiotic relationship between pollsters 
and newspapers was indispensable in the early period of opinion polling: The pollsters 
needed mass media as outlets for disseminating their poll results while the newspapers 
needed more sources and content of news.  Especially to the newspapers in the early 
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20th century, the opinion polls were attractive because they provided “objective” 
nonpartisan content for the readers, which would “appeal to a larger number of readers 
than the parties” (Butler, 2007, p. 36).     
Although the origin of opinion polling involves the interests of pollsters and 
newspapers, the media coverage of opinion poll plays an important role in the process 
of individuals’ political judgments by providing the basis upon which people perceive 
public opinion.  Past studies indicate the media coverage of opinion polls influences 
political behaviors, such as voter turnout, as well as individuals’ perceptions of public 
opinion (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1994; Ceci & Kain, 1982; Hardy & Jamieson, 2005; 
Jacobs & Shapiro, 2005; Lang & Lang, 1984; Lavrakas & Traugott, 2000; Mendelsohn 
& Crespi, 1970; Mutz, 1998; Page, Shapiro, & Dempsey, 1987; Pan et al., 2006).   
Furthermore, public opinion polls are at the center of modern politics because 
they identify the “greatest concerns of voters” and the “policies that voters most want 
candidates to support” (Jacobs & Shapiro, 2005, p. 635).  The state or national opinion 
polls give politicians and policy makers a general sense of public concerns and 
preferences on issues and policies (Herbst, 1993; Klotzer, 2008; Monroe, 1998; Page et 
al., 1987; Price, 2008).  Public opinion polls contribute to “structuring public opinion on 
issues and…guiding the development of policy, especially domestic policy” (Traugott, 
1992, p. 144).  According to Paletz and colleagues’ (1980) content analysis of the news 
media in the 1970s, the New York Times published news stories using public opinion 
polls on average once every three days.  The content of more than 30% of the polls was 
policy issues, such as social, economic, and foreign policies.  In 1990s, opinion polls 
were published “practically every day” in the major news media (Brettschneider, 2008, 
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p. 479).  Weaver and Kim (2002) found 9,618 poll stories in the New York Times and 
Washington Post between 1996 and 1998.  Although these poll results are not supposed 
to be used “merely to cater to citizens’ whims and desires, regardless of their efficacy 
and value,” opinion poll results surely function as an “instrument to monitor, gauge, 
predict, and assess the voice of the people” (Eisinger, 2008, p. 494).  It is indisputable 
that public opinion polling plays a crucial role in modern political decision making 
processes.      
Criticisms of public opinion polls.  Despite its role in political decision making 
processes, the use of opinion polling has been criticized by academics, journalists, and 
political critics.  One of the criticisms is that elected public officials should not just 
follow popular support only to ensure their stay in office but advocate their own policy 
agenda (Butler, 2007).  According to this criticism, government officials should not be 
dependent on public opinion polls in policy making processes even though disregarding 
polls can be politically dangerous.  The concern that America has a government “of the 
polls, by the polls, for the polls” represents this critical view on the overuse and/or 
misuse of opinion polls (Traugott, 1992, p. 144).   
Some criticisms involve skepticism on opinion polling itself, specifically, 
regarding whether polling can fully reflect the public opinion.  The skepticism is two-
fold: 1) measurement of true public opinion and 2) ordinary citizens’ ability to 
understand and evaluate the issues that are addressed in polls.   
First, some scholars argue polls cannot truly measure public opinion.  Herbst 
(1993) argues polls are assumed to be objective and scientific information that is value-
free.  Despite the assumption, it is possible for the polls to be framed and distorted by 
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their users such as media, politicians, and interest groups.  It is only an illusion that the 
public opinion as an objective truth exists to be caught by opinion polling (Herbst, 
1993).  Public opinion is not a fixed but a dynamic concept ever shifting, depending on 
social, political, and historical contexts (Glynn et al., 2004).  Lewis (2001) asserts 
polling is merely a numerical representation rather than an actual measure of public 
opinion.  According to his argument, polls are devices to construct reality in order for 
the media and elite to persuade people to accept their depictions of consensus rather 
than “scientific” instruments to produce objective knowledge (p. x).  This is because the 
pollsters can establish the framework of the questions and set the parameters for the 
responses in most opinion surveys (Lewis, 2001).  In this “social constructionist” 
perspective, public opinion represented by poll results should not be understood without 
examining the agencies, news media in many cases, which influence and conduct the 
polls.  Therefore, in order to interpret poll responses, the readers should understand the 
contexts, such as ideological conditions in which the poll results are produced.  That is, 
if we want to understand the results of the polls conducted by news media, we should 
examine the way the news media framed the issue and the pressures on the news media 
to construct a specific view of the issue.  In this view, survey data represent merely 
“measured opinion” and true public opinion cannot be measured by polls (Traugott & 
Lavrakas, 2008, p. 4).    
The second skepticism is on the public’s lack of ability to understand and assess 
public issues.  In this view, the public does not have the “necessary knowledge, skills, 
and wisdom to identify their interests and the country's” (Jacobs & Shapiro, 2005, p. 
635).  Furthermore, in that most of the public is “disengaged” from political and social 
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issues, the public is not expected to deeply understand and assess public policies (Butler, 
2007, p. 109).  Respondents answer a survey interview question with “only top-of-mind 
views” without deep understanding and evaluation of the issues (Lewis, 2001, p. 25).  
Thus, users of polls such as the media, politicians, or interest groups can easily take 
advantage of the public’s incompetency and sway the public opinion by distorting and 
manipulating poll results (Mendelsohn & Crespi, 1970).  For example, political elites 
may take advantage of polls by subtle and strategic framing; polls can be used by them 
to reinforce their side’s political position and shift the media frame in favor of their side 
(Lewis, 2001; Simon & Jerit, 2007).  Skeptics of opinion polls suspect the parties 
selectively and strategically use poll results for “rhetorical purposes” (Herbst, 1998, p. 
48; Lewis, 2001).  Jacobs and Shapiro (2005) also assert polls are blamed because 
politicians or interest groups overuse and/or misuse them.  This suspicion that users of 
opinion polls distort the information from polling elevates distrust of public opinion 
itself (Jacobs & Shapiro, 2005).                
Other critics argue media coverage of opinion polls rather than opinion polling 
per se is problematic.  Traugott (2004) points out inaccurate reporting of opinion poll 
results by journalists who lack adequate methodological training and familiarity with 
important public opinion concepts is one of the critical problems in media coverage of 
opinion polls.  He argues journalists are “handicapped by the strategic behavior of some 
groups in misrepresenting the current state of opinion on issues of particular concern to 
them” (p. 79).  Polls themselves have no direct route into public consciousness without 
media coverage of the poll data.  Media coverage of polls provides the public a chance 
to help set the public agenda and define the meanings of issues if the poll is “properly 
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conducted, analyzed, and presented” (Lewis, 2001, p. 78).  However, because the 
significance of polls depends on media coverage, the influence of polls is “bound up 
with” the influence of media and political elites who control the media (Lewis, 2001, p. 
35).  Furthermore, media polling, in which the media conducts and reports opinion 
polling, allows the media full access to polling process from framing the questions to 
reporting the results.  Some scholars even argue media polling is a misuse of public 
opinion surveys because the role of media is not manufacturing news but reporting it 
(Butler, 2007).  The media is not supposed to shape political opinion with interpretive 
frameworks, which tend to create prejudiced reflection of public opinion (Lippmann, 
1922).  Nonetheless, the results of the opinion polls conducted and reported by news 
media are often interpreted and framed by reporters to fit their own story (Lewis, 2001).   
These negative views of opinion polls assume polls affect individuals’ 
judgments on issues, policies, or candidates.  Despite numerous pitfalls and criticisms 
of polling, opinion polls are generally perceived to affect political behaviors, such as 
voting behavior, funding for candidates, and public policy changes (de Vreese & 
Semetko, 2002; Klotzer, 2008; Price & Stroud, 2006).  
 Effects of opinion polls.  Is the public actually influenced by polls?  Traugott 
(1992) argues the dissemination of public opinion data has an impact on subsequent 
opinion and behavior of audience:  Knowledge of what others think or believe, or how 
those opinions are changing, has an effect on people’s opinions and behavior. 
“Bandwagon” and “underdog” effects are most often contested in the research on the 
impact of the exposure to poll results (Hardmeier, 2008; Traugott, 2004).  Bandwagon 
effect describes the tendency of voters to support the candidate who the election polls 
 15 
 
predict will win the election while underdog effect is the tendency of voters to support 
the candidate who the polls predict will lose the election out of sympathy (Traugott & 
Lavrakas, 2008).  The tendency of voters to support a candidate who is leading or 
behind should be influenced by the media coverage of poll results that show the 
candidate’s standing in the race.   
Nonetheless, findings of previous studies on the effects of opinion polls on 
individuals’ attitudes and/or behaviors are equivocal (de Vreese & Semetko, 2002; 
Hardmeier, & Roth, 2001; Lang & Lang, 1984; Mendelsohn & Crespi, 1970; Navazio, 
1977).  Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1994) examined the impact of poll results on voter 
support for candidates.  The results indicate although people become more positive 
toward the leading candidate, the exposure to poll results did not affect their intention to 
vote.  The examination of the linkage between attitude and behavior required the 
consideration of other moderating variables, especially involvement (partisanship).  
Other research found evidence that the direction of influence is the opposite 
(Mendelsohn & Crespi, 1970).  Thus, it is not the exposure to a poll report per se, but 
the degree of political involvement that strongly influences the attitudes and voting 
behavior.  Regarding election polls, past research has found no conclusive evidence of 
either bandwagon or underdog effects (de Vreese & Semetko, 2002; Hardmeier, 2008; 
Lang & Lang, 1984; Mendelsohn & Crespi, 1970; Navazio, 1977).  Some scholars 
maintain it might be that “both bandwagon and underdog effects which, in net, canceled 
each other out” (Mendelsohn & Crespi, 1970, p. 20).  A meta- analysis of the studies 
evaluating the influence of opinion polls on the voting behavior or the intention to vote 
for a specific party or candidate found no strong effect of published polls: The effect 
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coefficients (r) for bandwagon and underdog effects were 0.12 and 0.04 respectively 
(Hardmeier, 2008).         
Although past research does not provide clear-cut evidence to support the effects 
of opinion polls on individuals’ behaviors or behavioral intention, it seems plausible to 
predict information on what others think or believe has an effect on people’s opinions.  
Previous research found significant attitude changes among participants after their 
exposure to poll reports (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1994; Kim, 2009).  Based on the 
findings of the previous studies, following hypothesis is posited:  
H1: Respondents’ attitude on an issue changes after the exposure to a 
news report of an opinion poll regarding the issue. 
Theoretical Framework  
Hostile media effect.  Although whether polls should be used to measure public 
opinion or poll results widely disseminated is still debated among scholars and critics, a 
general perception that opinion polling is an egalitarian and democratic form of public 
representation is widespread (Traugott, 2004).  The first national survey on polls 
conducted in 1944 indicates awareness of opinion polls was already widespread and 
evaluations of polls were generally positive at that time of the survey.  In this survey, 
56% of the respondents knew about polls, and 28% of the respondents followed poll 
results either “regularly” (9%) or “occasionally” (19%) (Traugott, 2004, p. 80).  The 
results also indicated that the public generally believed polls had a positive impact on 
politics.  A recent national survey regarding the public’s interest in polls in 1990s 
revealed Americans were interested in media polling.  Specifically, two out of three 
respondents viewed media polls as a good way to inform and learn what other people 
 17 
 
are thinking (Shiraev & Sobel, 2006).  Traugott (2004) reviewed surveys on opinion 
polls from 1944 to 1996 indicating the public became attentive to polls although they 
did not show much interest in them and concluded “the public is receptive to polls 
reported in the news but may not be actively interested in searching such information” 
(p. 81).   
By 2000, 55% of the respondents answered the questions about the value and 
accuracy of polls that they represent the public interest only some of the time (Shiraev 
& Sobel, 2006).  Shiraev and Sobel (2006) report people are more skeptical about 
polling accuracy than before: “When Fox news asked registered voters whether opinion 
polls represent what people think about important issues, two-thirds of respondents 
were skeptical” (p. 47).  Especially when the results of opinion polls are not consistent 
with their own opinion, people would be more likely to view the results as inaccurate or 
unfair.  This tendency is predicted by the hostile media effect (HME) hypothesis.  
 Studies regarding the biased perceptions of media bias demonstrate that people 
tend to believe neutral news coverage of an issue is biased against their view (Christen, 
Kannaovakun, & Gunther, 2002; Giner-Sorolla & Chaiken, 1994; Gunther, 1992; 
Gunther & Schmitt, 2004; Gunther & Liebhart, 2006; Perloff, 1989; Vallone et al., 
1985).  This hostile media perception leads to the biased perception of public opinion 
through the exaggerated perception of media influence on public opinion.  Perloff 
(1989) found in his study of the news coverage of the 1982 war in Lebanon that pro-
Israeli and pro-Palestinian partisans viewed neutral news coverage as biased against 
their sides.  Each side also believed the news coverage would cause neutral viewers to 
become more unfavorable toward their side and more favorable toward their antagonists.  
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However, the results of the study revealed the news coverage actually had not 
significantly influenced people' attitudes toward Israel or the PLO.  That is, the 
partisans tended to exaggerate the magnitude of the bias of news coverage and its 
influence.   
 Dalton, Beck, and Huckfeldt’s (1998) study provides empirical evidence of 
HME through a content analysis of news and a survey of news consumers.  The 
researchers found whether on the left or right, partisans see the press as leaning toward 
their opponent.  These feelings are strongest among those who “perceive the media as 
hostile toward their preferred candidate” (p. 121).  Furthermore, they found perceptions 
of a newspaper’s partisan leaning have no influence on candidate images once 
partisanship is controlled.  This result implies perceptions of media effect are mostly a 
projection of political orientations of the perceivers with little independent impact of the 
political leaning of the newspaper.  The researchers maintain the evidence in support of 
the HME explains the general perception of media bias although the direction of the 
perceived bias is different depending on the perceiver’s view.  
 Partisans appear to be more sensitive to information in the media that is 
conflicting with their own view.  These partisans have the tendency to believe their own 
view is what the majority of the public supports (Wojcieszak & Price, 2009) and 
deserves coverage that is more favorable.  Thus, they would evaluate the news report 
that is congruent with their own view more highly than the news report that is 
incongruent with their view.  Therefore, the following is hypothesized: 
 H2: Those who read the news report of the poll result that is inconsistent 
with their own view are more likely to perceive the news report as biased 
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than those who read the news report of the poll result that is consistent 
with their own view.     
 Those who view news coverage as biased against their side also believe the 
news coverage influences neutral viewers to be more unfavorable toward their side and 
more favorable toward their antagonists’ side (Perloff, 1989).  The tendency to perceive 
a mediated message influences others more than self is explained by the third-person 
effect (TPE).  While the HME explains the tendency to exaggerate the bias of mediated 
messages, the TPE explains the tendency of exaggerated perception of the influence of 
the messages on other people.  The TPE will be reviewed in the following section in 
association with the hypotheses of the current study.       
The third-person effect.  The TPE was first hypothesized as a media effect by a 
sociologist W. Phillips Davison.  In the early days in his career, a historian questioned 
Davison about a phenomenon in the Iwo Jima Island during World War II (Davison, 
1983).  In the middle of the war, the Japanese distributed propaganda leaflets with the 
theme that the war is a white man’s war and the Japanese have no intention to fight with 
the African-Americans.  On the next day, the white officers withdrew the service unit 
consisting of African-American troops even though there was no evidence that the 
propaganda had any actual effects on the African-American troops.  The leaflets 
consequentially affected the reshuffle of the troops not because they actually influenced 
the African-American soldiers but because the white officers perceived the propaganda 
would exert influence on the African-American soldiers.  Reflecting upon this 
phenomenon, Davison (1983) proposed the hypothesis of TPE predicting that 
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…people will tend to overestimate the influence that mass communications have 
on the attitudes and behavior of others.  More specifically, individuals who are 
members of an audience that is exposed to a persuasive communication 
(whether or not this communication is intended to be persuasive) will expect the 
communication to have a greater effect on others than on themselves.  And 
whether or not these individuals are among the ostensible audience for the 
message, the impact that they expect this communication to have on others may 
lead them to take some action.  Any effect that the communication achieves may 
thus be due not to the reaction of the ostensible audience but rather to the 
behavior of those who anticipate, or think they perceive, some reaction on the 
part of others. (p. 3)   
The perception that a communication would influence others more than self affects 
individuals’ decisions or behaviors on the related social and political issues.  The 
individual decisions or behaviors can, in turn, affect public opinion.  For example, 
activists supporting censorship of media content will be more strongly motivated to 
participate in their activity when they perceive the public will be influenced by negative 
media content and consequentially contribute to the formation of a stronger public 
mood to pass censorship regulations (McLeod, Eveland, & Nathanson, 1997).  
 Since Davison’s proposition, studies have shown the robustness of the 
perceptual component of this effect (Cohen, Mutz, Price, & Gunther, 1988; Paul, 
Salwen, & Dupagne, 2000; Perloff, 1989, 1993, 2002; Sun et al., 2008).  Paul and 
colleagues (2000) conducted a meta-analysis of 62 TPE studies and 121 separate effect 
sizes and found a large overall effect size (r = .50) of the difference between estimated 
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media effects on self and others.  A more recent meta-analysis of 106 studies and 372 
effect sizes indicates a smaller but still moderately large effect size (r = .31) (Sun et al., 
2008).  Despite the robust empirical evidence supporting the perceptual hypothesis, why 
and how people perceive greater impacts on others are less known.  Identification of 
theoretical explanations is required for the TPE to be theoretically developed.  
Theoretical explanations. TPE researchers have attempted to explain the 
psychological mechanism underlying the phenomenon by drawing on diverse 
psychological theories and concepts, such as attribution theory (Gunther, 1991; Paul, et 
al., 2000), optimistic bias (Gunther & Mundy, 1993), social judgment (Paek et al., 
2005), and differential perceptual process of media effect schema (Perloff, 1996).  
Among the theories, attribution theory and optimistic bias have been most relied on to 
justify the TPE (Paul et al., 2000).   
Attribution theory is based on the assumption that people infer causes of their 
own and others’ behavior.  Heider (1958) asserts people seek to understand others’ 
actions and events that are relevant to them and seek causal explanations for the actions 
or events.  When people infer the causes of others’ actions, they attribute them to 
personal dispositions while attributing their own actions to situational factors (Jones & 
Nisbett, 1972).  For example, if a student came to class in her pajamas, the teacher 
would think she is too lazy to change (dispositional attribution).  On the other hand, if 
the teacher herself came to class in an inappropriate outfit, she would think it was an 
inevitable situation because she did not have any other clothes to wear (situational 
attribution).  When applied to mass communication, the differential attribution model 
predicts a person will perceive he or she understands the underlying persuasive 
 22 
 
intention of mediated message while others cannot recognize the underlying intention or 
persuasive effect of the message because of their dispositional flaw(s) such as gullibility, 
naiveté, and/or lack of intelligence (Paul, et al., 2000).  Gunther (1991) views the 
attribution hypotheses as relevant to the TPE because the theory explains people see 
others as “less responsive to the situation” and attribute “the greater persuasibility” on 
others (p. 357).  According to this explanation based on the attribution theory, people 
estimate a greater message impact on others than themselves because they are more 
likely to infer situational causes than dispositional ones when they assess the effects of 
communication on themselves whereas when they judge the message impact on others, 
they attribute more dispositional than situational causes.  However, attribution theory 
does not explain the part of the stimulus (i.e., a possible cause without regard to whether 
disposition or situation will moderate it) and estimating its effect, which is what the 
TPE is about (Meirick, 2010).  
In order to explain the psychological mechanism of differentiation of “I” and 
“others,” Gunther and Mundy (1993) proposed the concept of “optimistic bias,” which 
refers to the tendency of people to think they are less likely to have negative 
experiences than others (p. 60).  Weinstein (1980) predicted and found “people believe 
that negative events are less likely to happen to them than to others, and they believe 
positive events are more likely to happen to them than to others” (p. 807).  Based on 
this biased optimism, it is assumed that people distinguish between societal-others and 
personal-self level impacts of media messages.  This biased optimism entails ego-
enhancement by estimating themselves to be smart enough to disbelieve media 
messages with persuasive intention while others are persuaded by the messages.  Thus, 
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messages that are more undesirable lead to a greater third-person perception, while 
third-person perception decreases or first-person perception manifests when messages 
are perceived as desirable (Gunther & Mundy, 1993; Gunther & Thorson, 1992).  The 
first-person perception will be discussed later in this section.  
Some scholars view the third-person perception as an outcome of social 
judgments under uncertainty.  Social judgments are “inferences on various social 
phenomena including the likelihood or frequencies of social events, possession of 
various personality attributes and their strengths, degrees of intensity of social 
interactions, and extent of social influences” (Paek, Pan, Sun, Abisaid, & Houden, 2005, 
p. 145).  Such cognitive tasks require seeking, processing, and evaluating information 
and drawing inferences from the information (Mussweiler, 2003).  Assessing how much 
a mediated message might affect a target individual or group involves a specific social 
judgment on the message and the target.  That is, individuals infer about the 
effectiveness of the message as well as the relevant characteristics of the target such as 
general vulnerability (McLeod, Detenber, & Eveland, 2001; Paek et al., 2005), 
perceived exposure to the message (Eveland et al., 1999) and perceived predispositions 
(Meirick, 2005). 
However, since people do not have sufficient information on the related factors 
in most cases of social judgment, they perform social judgment under the condition of 
uncertainty (Paek et al., 2005).  This uncertainty motivates individuals to seek 
predictable information and/or other communicative behavior (Berger, 1986).  When 
available information is imperfect and/or motivation for more information is not 
sufficient, cognitive heuristics or intuition is frequently employed in judgments in order 
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to reduce uncertainty (Paek et al., 2005).  Judgments formed from this shortcut without 
employing rationality, however, may result in fallacies in social judgment.  Paek and 
colleagues (2005) argue the third-person perception is this “cognitive fallacy that results 
from individuals rendering their estimates on the likelihood and intensity of a message 
effect on a target” (p. 146).  
There is another approach to explain the phenomenon: differentiation of 
perceptual processes for self and other (McLeod et al., 2001; Perloff, 1996; Salwen, 
1998).  This approach separates perceived media impacts on self and others. Perloff 
(1996) proposes that the mechanism of perceived media impacts on others is due to the 
“media effect schema,” which entails the belief that media message is powerful and 
people are influenced by the media message.  This schema does not work for perceivers 
themselves because people are not likely to recognize their own psychological 
functioning and vulnerabilities.  Although the explanation that individuals use the media 
effect schema for the perception of media effects on others while they do not use it for 
the perception of media effects on themselves seems plausible, this explanation alone 
does not untangle the complexity of the perceptual process for estimating effects on self.  
For example, when the media message is perceived as socially desirable, individuals are 
likely to show less third-person perception or the first-person perception that they will 
be more influenced by the message than others will ( Duck et al., 1995; Eveland & 
McLeod, 1999; Gunther & Mundy, 1993; Gunther & Thorson, 1992; White, 1997; 
White & Dillon, 2000).  This pattern indicates people recognize the media effect on 
themselves as well as on others.           
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Factors that influence the TPE.  Past research indicates the magnitude and 
direction of the perceived gap between the impact of media messages on self and others 
vary depending on several factors such as message desirability, definition of others, and 
the perceiver’s involvement level with the topic.     
First, message desirability is a central factor on which the magnitude and 
direction of a TPE depends (Comstock and Scharrer, 2005; David & Johnson, 1998; 
Gunther & Mundy, 1993; Paul et al., 2000; Sun et al., 2008).  Meta-analyses of the TPE 
demonstrate message desirability is an important moderator of the TPE (Paul et al., 
2000; Sun et al., 2008).  Comstock and Scharrer (2005) maintain there are 
circumstances when the TPE does not manifest.  For example, when the issue connotes 
“goodness or superiority, social desirability, or a more pleasant environment free of 
offensive communicatory stimuli,” the TPE decreases or disappears (p. 10).  In other 
words, the perception of greater impacts of communication on others than self occurs 
only when the impacts or the content of communication is perceived undesirable.  
Rucinski and Salmon (1990) also argue the effect is particularly likely to emerge when 
messages contain recommendations that are not perceived to be personally beneficial.  
On the other hand, when a media message is perceived as socially desirable, the 
TPE decreases (Eveland & McLeod, 1999; Gunther & Mundy, 1993; Gunther & 
Thorson, 1992), or a first-person effect, the perception of greater impacts on self than 
others, manifests (Duck et al., 1995; White, 1997; White & Dillon, 2000).  People may 
perceive themselves as more receptive to positive messages than other people, who are 
not seen as so shrewd and open-minded.  However, first-person effects are not as robust 
as third-person effects.  This may be because acknowledging influence on self can 
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conflict with self-esteem even if the influence is from a desirable message (Gunther & 
Mundy, 1993).    
Another possible reason for the unstable pattern in the manifestation of the first-
person effect under desirable message context is unclear definition of undesirability.  In 
that the social desirability of a message is not a fixed factor designated by researchers 
but contingent on respondents’ receptiveness, the presumably desirable message might 
not be perceived as desirable by the perceiver (Meirick, 2005).  Rucinski and Salmon 
(1990) found the magnitude of the third-person perception for polls was almost the 
same as that of negative political advertisements despite the researchers’ prediction that 
polls would be perceived as ‘objective’ and less harmful than negative political 
advertisements.  Dupagne, Salwen, and Paul (1999) also found no significant 
differences among the respondents’ support for restrictions on televised trials, television 
violence, and negative political advertising although the researchers had assumed 
television violence would be perceived undesirable and televised trials would be 
considered neutral.  These results suggest the perceived desirability of a message would 
be dependent on the perceivers’ judgment of the message.   
The judgment of a message is expected to depend on the perceiver’s position on 
the issue.  Tsfati (2001) found in his study on Israeli election polls that respondents’ 
political affiliation was one of the strongest predictors of their trust for media polls.  
People evaluate less on the credibility of the poll result that is not consistent with their 
prior beliefs because they tend to judge what they believe or what they want to hear as 
truthful (Tsfati, 2001).  The psychological process associated with the perceiver’s 
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position and his or her judgment of the message can be explained by the social 
judgment theory (Granberg, 1982).   
Social judgment theory posits that for a specific issue, an individual has an 
attitudinal continuum that is divided into three latitudes: acceptance, rejection, and 
noncommitment (Sherif & Hovland, 1961).  These latitudes affect how an incoming 
message will be judged (Sherif & Hovland, 1961; Greene, Parrott, & Serovich, 1993).  
If the message is agreeable, the message is in the latitude of acceptance.  If the message 
is objectionable, it is in the latitude of rejection (Gaske, 1983).  Whether a message falls 
in the latitude of acceptance or rejection is contingent on the individual’s own position 
(Gaske, 1983; Granberg, 1982; Sherif & Hovland, 1961).  Based on social judgment 
theory, if a news report is consistent with the reader’s position, the report would be 
more likely to fall within the latitude of acceptance because it is closer to the reader’s 
point of view.  In this case, the reader would find the report agreeable.  On the other 
hand, if a news report is inconsistent with the reader’s position, the report would be 
more likely to be judged as objectionable.  For instance, those who support the war in 
Iraq are more likely to perceive a report of an opinion poll whose results indicate the 
majority supports the war as acceptable, whereas those who oppose the war are more 
likely to perceive the same report as unacceptable.  In that TPE is greater for an 
undesirable message (Gunther & Mundy, 1993; Sun et al., 2008), those who perceive a 
news report as objectionable would show a greater TPE than those who perceive the 
report as acceptable.  Hence, it can be predicted the TPE would be greater for the reader 
whose position is inconsistent with the results of the news report.  However, the 
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desirability of a message does not function alone in the manifestation of the TPE but it 
is expected to interact with who the “others” are.  
Definition of others is another important factor of the TPE.  The magnitude of 
the TPE depends on “social-psychological relationship between the perceiver and the 
comparison other” (Duck et al., 1995, p. 209).  Andsager and White (2007) categorize 
the approaches to define others into two categories: social distance corollary and target 
corollary.  The social distance corollary involves the distance between self and self-
referent others such as social-psychological distance or geographical distance while the 
target corollary involves message referent others such as target audience group.   
First, in terms of the social distance, the distance between self and others is 
viewed as falling along a continuum going from “like me” to “not like me” (Duck, 
Hogg, & Terry, 1998, p. 3), and the third-person perception increases when the others 
are defined as those who are “not like me.”  That is, when others are designated as 
either out-group members (Duck, Hogg, & Terry, 1999, 2000; Meirick, 2004) or those 
who are geographically or social psychologically farther from the self (Cohen et al., 
1988; Cohen & Davis, 1991; Duck et al., 1995; Gunther, 1991), the third-person 
perception increases.  For example, Stanford University students perceived news stories 
would exert the greatest impact on “public opinion at large,” the next greatest impact on 
“other Californians,” and a lesser impact on “other Stanford students” (Cohen et al., 
1988).   
Second, according to the target corollary, perceived exposure of a particular 
target group also affects the magnitude of the third-person perception.  Lambe and 
McLeod (2005) found the largest third-person differential of beer ads was between self 
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and the 18-24 year old group.  Considering the generally known knowledge about 
drinking habits of college-aged students, it is reasonable for the respondents to assume 
beer ads would be a particularly salient message context for that age group.  Scharrer 
(2002) also reports some social groups such as children and those with low 
socioeconomic status are more likely to be perceived as susceptible to negative effects 
from television violence.  These findings imply stereotypes of those particular groups 
influence respondents’ perceptions of their vulnerability to certain media messages. 
Regarding the in- and out-group definition of others, Duck and colleagues 
(2000) argue “perceptions of persuasive impact on self and other are also dependent on 
salienti group memberships or social identities (e.g., gender identity, political identity, 
student identity)” (p. 266).  This argument is based on social identity theory, which 
explains the motivational bases and outcomes of identification with certain social 
groups (Tajfel, 1982; Turner, 1999).  Social identity theory posits that an individual 
divides the self into a personal identity and a social identity.  Social identity can be 
defined as an individual’s perception that “he/she belongs to certain social groups 
together with some emotional and value significance to him/her of the group 
membership” (Abrams & Hogg, 1990, p. 2).  That is, a significant part of an 
individual’s self-concept is derived from memberships in social groups and/or social 
categories, and this aspect of an individual’s self-concept based on his or her group 
membership is termed ‘social identity’ (Terry, Hogg, & Duck, 1999; Turner, 1999).  
According to the theory, an individual categorizes the self and others into groups by 
self-selected characteristics such as age (Hajek & Giles, 2002), gender (Hajek & Giles, 
2006), race (Fellows & Rubin, 2006; Fujioka, 2005; Mastin, Andsager, Choi, & Lee, 
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2007; Mastro, 2003; Mastro, Behm-Morawitz, & Kopacz, 2008), and political 
affiliation (Hogg, Terry, & White, 1995).  Each of these memberships “describes and 
prescribes one’s attributes as a member of that group,” and what and how one thinks, 
feels, and behaves is guided by this group membership (Hogg et al., 1995, p. 259).  
Thus, social identity theorists contend the concept of social identity and its processes 
are essential in understanding collective behavior (Tajfel, 1982; Turner, 1999).   
This social identity is used in social comparisons to enhance positive self-
concept and self-esteem.  The self-enhancement concept is derived from Festinger’s 
(1954) social comparison theory, which addresses people’s tendency to compare 
themselves with others on certain relevant dimensions.  Involving social identities, the 
comparison becomes between in- and out-groups instead of between individuals 
(Abrams & Hogg, 1990), and people’s desire for self-enhancement leads to the 
tendency to favor their in-group.  Hence, social identification is a mechanism for self-
enhancement as people attempt to see their in-group as being better than other groups 
(Hogg & Abrams, 1999).  In this sense, social identity theory provides an explanation 
for why individuals evaluate media effects differently on the in- and out-groups (Duck, 
et al., 1999; Gunther & Mundy, 1993; Gunther & Thorson, 1992).  Those who perceive 
themselves as smarter and more knowledgeable than others would see others as more 
susceptible to media messages because other people are credulous, naïve, and less 
knowledgeable.  Then, this self-serving bias is expanded to an in-group serving bias.  
Thus, when respondents identify themselves with an in-group, the TPE for the in-group 
is attenuated (Duck et al., 1999; Scharrer, 2002).   
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Based on these previous studies, it can be predicted people would show a greater 
TPE when others are defined as those who are far from themselves or comparatively 
different from themselves than when others are defined as those who are similar to 
themselves (Cohen et al., 1988; Cohen & Davis, 1991; Duck et al., 1995, 1999, 2000; 
Gunther, 1991; Gunther & Mundy, 1993; Gunther & Thorson, 1992; McLeod, Lambe, 
& Paek, 2005; Meirick, 2004; Pan et al., 2006).  This factor of others, however, would 
interact with the message factor in the manifestation of the TPP: The differential self-
other gap by in- and out- groups on the perceived impact of a message would be greater 
when the message is perceived as undesirable; On the other hand, when the message is 
perceived as desirable, the difference in the third-person perception for the in- and out- 
groups might decrease, or the direction of differential perception might be reversed.   
Thus, if the news report of an opinion poll is perceived to support their position, 
and is therefore, judged as desirable, individuals would suppose out-group members 
who are in their opposite position would be less influenced by the poll report than 
themselves and in-group members.  On the other hand, if the result of an opinion poll is   
opposed to their own position, individuals would perceive the poll result to have little 
influence on the self and in-group members relative to message-consistent out-group 
members (Cohen & Davis, 1991; Oliver, Yang, Ramasubramanian, Kim, & Lee, 2008).  
Previous research on the perceived effects of political campaigns indicates messages 
from in-group and out-group politicians were perceived to have differential effects on 
self, in-group members, and out-group members (Duck et al., 1995; Meirick, 2004).  
Hence, the following hypotheses predicting an interaction effect between the position of 
a news report and the position of others -- whether the others are designated as in- group 
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members (supporters of their view) or out-group members (opponents of their view) on 
the given issue -- are posited.    
H3a:  Those who read news reports of opinion polls that indicate the 
majority supports their position exhibit a smaller third-person perception 
for the opponents than for the supporters of their view.  
H3b:  Those who read news reports of opinion polls that indicate the 
majority supports the opposite position exhibit a greater third-person 
perception for the opponents than for the supporters of their view. 
The third main factor of the TPE is involvement. The TPE is predicted to be 
moderated by individuals’ ego-involvement level.  Personal significance and intensity 
of holding the position on an issue determines the ego-involvement on the issue (Sherif 
& Hovland, 1961).  Since ego-involvement is issue specific, a person might be highly 
involved in one issue, but not involved in another (Sherif & Hovland, 1961).  Social 
judgment theory specifies ego-involvement is the most salient factor determining the 
widths of the latitudes of acceptance and rejection (Granberg, 1982; Sherif & Hovland, 
1961).  According to the theory, as involvement increases, the latitudes of acceptance 
and noncommitment shrink and the latitude of rejection expands while the latitude of 
noncommitment expands as involvement decreases (Granberg, 1982).  As the latitudes 
of acceptance of those with high ego involvement are narrow, they are less likely to be 
persuaded or influenced by a message.  That is, it is hard to influence the highly 
involved people because they are already committed to a point of view.  Thus, highly 
involved people are more likely to show a greater third-person perception on a message 
because they perceive its impact on self as minimal compared to its impact on others.   
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On the other hand, those who are not involved with the given issue are less 
likely to show the differential perceived effect between self and others.  Granberg 
(1982) maintains to the extent that the issue at hand is important to the person, his or her 
own attitude would serve as “an anchor in the psychological processes of perception 
and judgment of a communication” (p. 306).  Mendelsohn and Crespi (1970) also 
contend the involvement of those who read or view the news reports of poll results and 
their “expectations” affect the readers’ or viewers’ evaluation of the reports (p. 12).  
That is, those who are sufficiently involved with the issue around which the opinion 
poll revolves are more likely to judge the report as acceptable or unacceptable and 
manifest the differential TPE.  Those with too low involvement rarely perceive impacts 
of mediated messages at all (Morley, 1984).  Previous TPE research has found 
involvement and/or predisposition on an issue magnify the TPE on the message about 
the issue (Mutz, 1989; Perloff, 1989, 1999; Vallone et al., 1985).  Hence, individuals’ 
ego-involvement is predicted to function as a moderator such that those with low 
involvement are less likely to show the differential self-other gaps of perceived effects 
of the news report.  
H4: Highly involved individuals show a greater differential third-person 
perception for the news reports than less involved individuals. 
Behavioral component of TPE.  Although the majority of past TPE studies have 
focused on the perceptual gap between media influence on self and others, it should be 
noted the TPE is composed of two components – the perceptual component (perception 
of greater effects of message on others than self) and the behavioral component 
(association between the perceptual gap and its consequences) (Cohen & Davis, 1991; 
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McLeod, et al., 2005; Schmierbach, Boyle, & McLeod, 2008; Sun et al., 2008).  
Davison’s (1983) seminal idea of the TPE includes the consequence of the third-person 
perception.  In the anecdote about the reshuffle of troops in the Iwo Jima Island during 
World War II, the perceived impact of the Japanese leaflets on African-American 
soldiers (perceptual component of the TPE) led to the white officers’ decision to 
withdraw the African-American troops (behavioral component of the TPE).  It seems 
plausible that people who assume influences of media messages on others would react 
to the perception by adapting their behavior.  Regardless of any actual direct effects, 
media exert indirect effects on individuals’ behavior through presumed influence on 
others (Gunther & Storey, 2003).   
Despite the logical plausibility of the linkage between the third-person 
perception and its consequences, until recently the behavioral component of the TPE 
has not been tested as much as the perceptual component (Banning, 2006; Lo, Wei, & 
Lu, 2007; McLeod et al., 2005; Sun et al., 2008).  Furthermore, research on the 
association between the two components has shown inconsistent results, with only part 
of the studies finding the behavioral component of the TPE significant (Banning, 2006; 
Gunther & Storey, 2003; Lo, Wei, & Lu, 2007; Nathanson, Eveland, Park, & Paul, 
2002; Neuwirth, Frederick, & Mayo, 2002; Salwen & Dupagne, 1999; Shah, Faber, & 
Youn, 1999; Sun et al., 2008).  Hence, the current study examines the behavioral 
hypothesis of the TPE, focusing on the relationship between the third-person perception 
of news reports of opinion poll results and its consequences.   
In order to explicate the linkage between the third-person perception and its 
consequences, scholars have employed diverse approaches.  Some researchers adopted 
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the social identity theory that explains in-, and out-group identities draw the line 
between the self group and the other group in the third-person perception.  Duck and 
colleagues (1995) argue perceptions of self-other differences regarding media 
vulnerability are influenced by the perceived salience of the social relationships 
between self and other, social identity, and differentiation from others.  In this view, 
social identity generates motivation to identify with an in-group to which individuals 
perceive they belong, stimulating adaptive behavior in order to actualize social identity 
with the in-group (Banning, 2006).  Scharrer (2002) suggests self-categorization theory 
in addition to the social identity theory as the explanations for the behavioral hypothesis 
of TPE.  According to the self-categorization theory, the self-concept is in part 
determined by membership in social groups, and perceived similarities between the self 
and in-groups as well as perceived differences between the self and out-groups lead to 
the act of self-categorization into groups, which reinforces the group identification.   
Some other researchers differentiated the process of reacting to the third-person 
perception by desirability of message.  They assert people take a preventative reaction 
to presumed negative impacts of mediated messages while they accommodate presumed 
desirable impacts (Gunther, Bolt, Borzekowski, Liebhart, & Dillard, 2006).  For 
example, if people believe viewing sexually explicit content in media will corrupt other 
people’s morals, they may support censorship of such content in an effort to thwart the 
undesirable outcome.  On the other hand, if people assume an advertisement would 
influence public opinion about what is fashionable and attractive, they may adopt the 
new fashions in the advertisement.  Sun and colleagues (2008) also found perceived 
desirability of the message affects behavioral likelihood: The messages that were 
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perceived undesirable were related to a greater likelihood of engaging in corrective 
behaviors whereas the messages that were perceived desirable led to a greater likelihood 
of taking actions to amplify the messages.  
In the current study, another approach to link the perceptual and behavioral 
components of the TPE is proposed in terms of psychological reactance.  Psychological 
reactance, which is also called “boomerang effect,” explains a phenomenon in which a 
message meant to move individuals in one direction actually moves them in the 
opposite direction.  Reactance refers to “the motivational state that is hypothesized to 
occur when a freedom is eliminated or threatened with elimination” (Brehm & Brehm, 
1981, p. 37).  According to this theory, if an individual’s freedom is reduced or 
threatened, this person would be motivationally aroused against any further loss of 
freedom or toward the re-establishment of the freedom (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 
1981; Burgoon, Alvaro, Grandpre, & Voulodakis, 2002).  For example, if voters believe 
other voters would be more influenced by negative political campaign messages 
attacking their preferred candidate, they may feel threatened and will be motivated to 
react to the persuasive impacts of the message on others by turning out to vote in order 
to counteract the presumed influence of the message.   
From the perspective of reactance theory, if people perceive a news article that 
is not consistent with their own opinion to have influence on others toward the opposite 
view from their own position, they might experience reactance from having their 
freedom to adopt their own opinion threatened by the news article.  Then, they will 
attempt to re-establish their freedom by not taking the position indicated in the news 
article.  Furthermore, they can more clearly re-establish the freedom to take their own 
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position by moving away from the position supported by the news article.  For example, 
those who are against censorship would experience reactance if they read a news article 
covering an opinion poll results that the majority supports censorship because they 
would be afraid the results influence the public opinion and cause stricter censorship.  
As they feel their freedom is threatened, they might become more active in their 
advocacy.  On the other hand, if the news article supports their own opinion, they would 
not experience reactance because their freedom is not threatened.  Based on these 
assumptions drawn from reactance theory, the relationship between the perceptual and 
behavioral components of the TPE is expected to be differential depending on the 
message-subject consistency.  Thus, a hypothesis predicting the consistency between 
participants’ attitude and the position of the news article will moderate the relationship 
between the third-person perception and its consequences -- the change in attitude and 
behavioral intention -- is posited.   
H5a: Message-subject inconsistency moderates the relationship between 
the third-person perception and behavioral intention change such that the 
relationship is stronger with inconsistent message.  
H5b: Message-subject inconsistency moderates the relationship between 
the third-person perception and attitudinal change such that the 
relationship is stronger with inconsistent message. 
In that people would react against the perceived influence of a news article if 
they believed its influence will result in a threat to their freedom (Brehm, 1966), 
psychological reactance might affect the association between the perceptual and 
behavioral components of the TPE.  Whether the magnitude of threat has an effect on 
 38 
 
the association between the perceptual and behavioral elements of the TPE is tested 
based on the assumption that the magnitude of reactance is positively associated with 
the strength of the threat to freedom (Brehm, 1966; Dillard & Shen, 2005).  If 
individuals are threatened by the perception that a news article would have influence on 
others toward the opposite position of their own, they will react against the perceived 
influence of the news article.  Those who have a stronger third-person perception will 
feel more threatened, and those who feel more threatened will show a stronger reactance 
behavior.  Thus, the mediating role of threat in the relationship between the third-person 
perception and its consequences – the change in attitudes toward the restrictions and 
behavioral intention – is predicted.  
H6a: Threat mediates the relationship between the third-person perception 
and the change in behavioral intention. 
H6b: Threat mediates the relationship between the third-person perception 
and the change in attitude toward the restrictions. 
The role of emotion.  In the present study, emotion is also examined as a 
mediator in the relationship between the perceptual and behavioral components of the 
TPE.  Although past TPE research has not tapped the emotional element of TPE, there 
are reasons to believe emotions play a role.  Emotions are believed to be able to 
motivate adaptive behaviors in reaction to a message (Lazarus, 1991; Nabi, 1999).  
According to functional theories of emotions, when individuals perceive a stimulus in 
the environment, they evaluate the stimulus in terms of its significance for individual 
survival and well-being (Scherer, 2001).  This appraisal leads to certain emotional states, 
and the action tendencies of the emotions are linked with physiological changes that 
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affect subsequent perceptions and behaviors (Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989; 
Kepplinger, 2008; Lazarus, 1991; Nabi, 2003; Roseman & Smith, 2001).  Thus, 
emotions can arouse behavioral intentions that are consistent with the specific emotions 
(Nerb & Spada, 2001).  For example, anger is linked to the tendency to boycott while 
sadness is related with the tendency to help.  In reactance research, negative emotions 
are expected to function as a catalyst to motivate people to engage in certain behaviors 
to re-establish their threatened freedom (Brehm, 1966).  Empirical evidence indicates 
the mediating role of anger in reactance (Dillard & Shen, 2005; Quick, Bates, & 
Quinlan, 2009).  Previous research has also found negative affect can produce an 
overestimation of risk, which in turn leads to risk averse and/or avoidance behavior 
(Huddy, Feldman, & Cassese, 2007).   
In the TPE process, those who feel negative emotions because of the third-
person perception would be more likely to react by adapting their behavior.  Even if 
people perceive greater impacts on others, if they are not motivated to take action 
against the perceived impacts, the third-person perception would not be connected to 
their behavioral changes.  Although not explicitly stated, support for the notion of 
emotions as a mediator of the relationship between the third-person perception and its 
behavioral consequence is implicit in many of the TPE studies.  For example, the white 
officers who made the decision to withdraw African American troops in Iwo Jima 
during World War II would not have made that decision if they were not worried about 
the perceived influence of the Japanese leaflets on the African American troops 
(Davison, 1983).  Hence, it would be worthwhile to explore the role of emotion in the 
TPE, particularly negative emotion such as fear or anxiety.   
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Hwang, Pan and Sun (2008) found the hostile media perception was associated 
with negative emotions labeled media indignation and this media indignation was, in 
turn, related with willingness to engage in discursive activities.  That is, the emotional 
reactions mediated the hostile media perception and its behavioral consequences.  The 
mechanism by which negative emotions mediate the association between the hostile 
media perception and its behavioral consequence might be applicable to the linkage 
between the third-person perception and its behavioral outcome.  However, the nature 
of the negative emotions that are involved with the third-person perception is different 
from the media indignation such as anger, disgust, contempt, and resentment (Hwang et 
al., 2008).   
In the TPE literature, fear is the most frequently used term for the emotional 
reactions (Cohen & Davis, 1991; Perloff, 2002; Price & Stroud, 2006; Wei & Lo, 2007).  
Fear is generally aroused when a situation is perceived as threatening to one’s physical 
or psychological self (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991).  The action tendency of fear is to 
escape from and/or avoid the threatening agent in order to protect self from the physical 
or psychological threat (Frijda, 1986; Nabi, 1999).  Thus, fear is considered the 
strongest emotion to motivate people to take avoidance actions responding to the fear-
evoking situation (Nabi, 1999).  In the TPE process, fear and its action tendency would 
be extended to the “feeling a need to protect vulnerable others” in response to the TPP 
of a message (Banning, 2006).  In other words, the action tendency of fear might 
motivate individuals to react against the presumed negative impacts of the message on 
others.  Nonetheless, the negative emotion elicited after the third-person perception is 
not exactly fear because the object of the feeling is not an imminent, concrete, and life 
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threatening danger (Izard, 1977; Lazarus, 1984) but something that is expected to occur 
in the future.   
The emotional state of uneasiness from the perception of negative influence on 
other people can be identified as anxiety, which is anticipatory and occurs under 
conditions of ambiguity (Lazarus, 1984), rather than fear.  While fear results from 
exposure to danger, anxiety results from perceived threat of danger (Izard, 1977).  
However, as anxiety is described largely in terms of fear, it is also called “fear 
anticipation” (Izard, 1977, p. 376).  That is, although anxiety is almost equivalent to 
fear, it is distinguished from fear in that it involves more cognitive process 
(anticipation).  The term anxiety used by Marcus and colleagues reflects “mechanisms 
that already join cognitions with emotion” (Marcus & Mackuen, 1993).  Like fear, 
anxiety has an adaptive function.  When an individual foresees a negative event, anxiety 
prepares the individual to avoid it or prevent it from occurring (Izard, 1977).  For 
example, Marcus and colleagues (2000) assert anxiety leads to such actions as more 
systematic information seeking and more active participation in elections.  Hence, it can 
be predicted those who perceived a presumably negative impact of a message on others 
would feel anxiety because of the third-person perception, and this anxiety, in turn, 
would motivate them to react against the foreseen negative event.       
H7a: Anxiety mediates the relationship between the third-person 
perception and the change in behavioral intention. 
H7b: Anxiety mediates the relationship between the third-person 
perception and the change in attitude toward the restrictions. 
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Method 
To test the hypotheses, an experiment was conducted with a 2 (message 
position: pro-restriction vs. anti-restriction) by 2 (subject position: pro-restriction vs. 
anti-restriction) by 2 (others: pro-restriction vs. anti-restriction) mixed factorial design 
with message position and subject position as between-subjects factors and others as a 
within-subjects factor.  
Government restriction on violent TV content is the issue used in the current 
study.  Pfau, Compton, Parker, An, Wittenberg, Ferguson, et al. (2006) found the issue 
of restricting TV violence represented a moderate involvement level among 
undergraduate students and the proportion of the participants who support the 
restrictions and those who oppose them was approximately even. 
Procedure  
A web-based experiment was created to investigate individuals’ perceptions of 
news coverage of the results of opinion polls on the government restrictions on violent 
TV programming.  Undergraduate students enrolled in communication courses at a 
Southwestern university volunteered to participate in the study in exchange for extra 
credit.  The web address of the survey was provided for the participants to access the 
study at any location with internet connection.     
The participants completed the pre-test questionnaire that included items about 
attitudes toward government restrictions on violent TV content (pre-stimulus attitude), 
behavioral intention regarding the restrictions (pre-stimulus behavioral intention), and 
their involvement level on the issue.  Then, the participants were assigned to one of the 
pro-restriction and anti-restriction message position groups.  The web-based online 
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questionnaire was programmed to assign each participant to one of the two groups 
randomly.  
After being assigned to one of the groups, the participants were asked to read a 
newspaper article reporting public opinion poll results on the issue (see Appendix B).  
Then, they completed the post-test questionnaire which included items on attitudes 
toward government restrictions on violent TV contents (post-stimulus attitude), 
behavioral intention regarding the restrictions (post-stimulus behavioral intention), 
evaluation of the article, degree of threat, degree of anxiety, hostile media perception, 
and perceived effects of the report on self, supporters of the restrictions, and opponents 
of the restrictions. 
In order to examine whether threat affects the relationship between the TPP and 
its consequences, half of the participants were given a threat inducement.  Those in the 
threat inducement group read the news articles with an additional paragraph reporting 
government actions on violent TV programs.  The paragraph, reporting the government 
will move toward the restrictions, was intended to increase threat among the opponents 
of the restrictions.  Likewise, the paragraph reporting the government will move against 
the restrictions was intended to increase threat among the proponents of the restrictions. 
In an effort to reinforce the threat inducement, a second phase of the study was 
conducted among those who participated in the first phase.  The participants in the first 
phase of the study were emailed a link to the second study two days after completing 
the first phase of the study.  The follow-up questionnaire for the second phase of the 
study included items about attitudes toward government restrictions on violent TV 
content and behavioral intention.  After completing the pre-stimulus questionnaire, 
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participants read a news article that was similar to the one used in the first phase but 
indicated it was published more recently than the previous one.  Then, the participants 
were asked about their attitudes toward government restriction on violent TV contents, 
behavioral intention, degree of threat, degree of anxiety, and perceived effects of the 
report on self, supporters of the restriction, and opponents of the restriction.   
Stimuli 
The pro-restriction message position group read a fictitious news article 
reporting an opinion poll result that the majority (70%) supports government 
regulations on violent television programming during hours when children might be 
watching.  About half of the group was exposed to the same news article with an 
additional paragraph reporting Congress is moving toward government regulations that 
would restrict violent programs to late evening, as a way of inducing threat for those 
who are against the regulations.  In the second phase, the group read a similar news 
article reporting opinion poll results that the majority (80%) supports the government 
regulations.        
The anti-restriction message position group read a fictitious news article 
covering an opinion poll result that the majority (70%) opposes the government 
regulations.  In order to induce threat for those who support the regulations, a paragraph 
on the Supreme Court’s decision to deny a law dealing with violent television 
programming that would disable the movement of Congress toward the government 
regulations was added at the end of the article for half of the group.  In the second phase, 
this group was provided with a similar news article about opinion poll results that the 
majority (80%) is against the government regulations.  
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The articles were created based on actual newspaper articles covering opinion 
poll results.  The poll numbers in the news articles were modified, and the titles of the 
newspapers were replaced by the Boston Post, which does not currently exist, so that 
the participants believed they are reading a Boston Post article.  The title of the 
fictitious newspaper was used in order to avoid copyright issues.  
Measures  
Attitude toward restrictions.  Attitudes toward government restrictions on 
violent TV content were measured with a generic attitude scale developed by Burgoon, 
Cohen, Miller, and Montgomery (1978).  This measure uses six 7-interval semantic 
differential-type items bounded by bipolar adjectives.  Adjective pairs include: 
wrong/right, negative/positive, unfavorable/favorable, unacceptable/acceptable, 
foolish/wise, and bad/good.  An attitude score was created by averaging the scores of 
the responses to the six items.  Based on this measure before the exposure to the stimuli, 
the positions of participants were categorized into either pro-restriction or anti-
restriction.  Reliability for the measure was α = .93.  After the exposure to the stimuli, 
the same items were asked as the post-stimulus attitude items (α = .95).  Attitudinal 
change items were calculated by subtracting the pre-stimulus attitude items from the 
post-stimulus attitude items.  By averaging the attitudinal change items, an attitudinal 
change score was created to be used as a dependent variable in testing H7b and H8b.       
Behavioral intention.  Behavioral intention was measured by asking the 
respondents three 7-interval items adapted from Sun and colleague’s (2008) study on 
the behavioral component of the TPE: (a) I would sign a petition for regulating violent 
television programming; (b) I would e-mail or call a television station or government 
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agency to complain about violent content on television; (c) I would say that violent 
content should be banned from television show during hours when children might be 
watching if I am asked for a survey on the issue.  Reliability for the measure was α 
= .79.  After the exposure to the stimuli, the same items were asked as the post-stimulus 
behavioral intention items.  Behavioral intention scores before and after stimulus, 
respectively, were created by averaging the scores of the responses to the three items.  
A behavioral intention change score was produced by subtracting the behavioral 
intention score measured before stimulus from the score measured after stimulus.  This 
behavioral intention change score was used as a dependent variable in testing H7a and 
H8a. 
Evaluation of article.  The news articles were evaluated by a measure 
composed of three 7-interval semantic differential-type items bounded by bipolar 
adjectives, following Smith, Atkin, Martell, Allen, and Hembroff (2006) and Sherif and 
Hovland (1961).  Adjective pairs include: like/dislike, acceptable/objectionable and 
believable/unbelievable.  An evaluation of article score was created by averaging the 
scores of the responses to the items. Reliability for the score was α = .74.       
Third-person perception (TPP).  In order to measure the perceived effect, 
participants were asked the following questions: “Think about the effects that the report 
of poll results would have on you/restriction supporters/restriction opponents.  Indicate 
the degree of the effects on a scale ranging from -3 for ‘make more anti-restriction’ to 3 
for ‘make more pro-restriction’.  Overall, how much would you/restriction supporters/ 
restriction opponents be affected by the report?” (Lambe & McLeod, 2005).  Then, the 
third-person perception (TPP) scores for supporters and opponents of the restrictions 
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were calculated by subtracting the score of the perceived effect on self from the scores 
of the perceived effect on supporters and opponents of the restrictions respectively, 
which means the TPPs on supporters and opponents of the restrictions were used 
separately in the analyses.    
Involvement.  Involvement level on the government restrictions on violent TV 
content was measured with eight 7-interval semantic differential scale items bounded by 
the following bipolar adjectives: unimportant/important, irrelevant/relevant, 
insignificant/significant, inconsequential/consequential, unpleasant/pleasant, 
unpleasurable/pleasurable, not punishing/punishing, and unsatisfying/satisfying  (Miller 
& Averbeck, 2009).  Reliability for the measure was α = .72.  An involvement index 
was created by averaging the scores of the responses to the eight items.  In order to test 
the moderating role of involvement in the interaction among the factors of the TPP, a 
dichotomous involvement variable with high involvement (=1) and low involvement 
(=0) was produced from the involvement index.  If a case has an involvement index 
higher than 4.2, it was coded as high involvement while a case with an involvement 
index of 4.2 or below was coded as low involvement.     
Perceived orientation of report.  In order to check whether the articles were 
perceived differently in terms of their orientation towards the government restrictions 
on violent TV content, two items were asked:  The newspaper article made government 
restrictions on violent TV content seem 1) likable/unlikable and 2) good/bad.  Scales 
ranging from 1 for ‘unlikable’ and ‘bad’ to 7 for ‘likable’ and ‘good’ were used.   A 
perceived orientation of report score was created by averaging the scores of the 
responses to the two items. Reliability for the score was α = .86.    
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Hostile media perception.  Hostile media perception (HMP) was measured by 
participants’ evaluation of the news article in terms of its bias against pro-restriction or 
anti-restriction.  The measure employed in previous research was adapted and utilized 
for this study (Vallone et al., 1985; Giner-Sorolla and Chaiken, 1994; Arpan & Raney, 
2003).  The perceived bias of the news reports of opinion poll results was measured by 
four items: 1) The article is biased against/in favor of the government restrictions on 
violent TV content, 2) The writer of the article is biased against/in favor of the 
government restrictions on violent TV content, 3) The newspaper that printed the article 
is biased against/in favor of the government restrictions on violent TV content, and 4) 
The poll results are biased against/in favor of the government restrictions on violent TV 
content.  These items utilized a 7-point scale from -3 for ‘greatly biased against the 
restrictions’ to +3 for ‘greatly biased in favor of the restrictions’.  Responses were 
averaged to yield the HMP score.  Reliability for the score was α = .87.   
Degree of Threat.  To assess whether participants perceived the news article to 
threaten or eliminate their freedom to retain their own attitude, three items adapted from 
the measure employed in Dillard and Shen’s (2005) study was used.  The measure on a 
scale of -3 for ‘strongly disagree’ to 3 for ‘strongly agree’ included: (a) I feel the news 
article tries to manipulate me on the issue; (b) I feel the news article tries to pressure me 
on the issue; and (c) I feel the news article threatens my freedom to choose my own 
opinion on the issue.  The original measure used by Dillard and Shen (2005) had one 
more item, “The message tried to make a decision for me”, but this item was not 
included in the current study because it did not seem to fit the context of the study.  A 
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degree of threat score was created by averaging the scores of the responses to the three 
items.  Reliability for the measure was α = .89.   
Degree of anxiety.  Anxiety was measured by 3 items adapted from the emotion 
scale used in Meirick, Nisbett, and Kim’s study (2010).  This scale includes: afraid, 
feeling threatened, and worried.  These items utilized a 7-point scale from 1 for ‘not at 
all’ to 7 for ‘very much’.  Averaging the responses to the 3 items created a degree of 
anxiety score.  Reliability for the score was α = .76.  
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Results 
Data Set 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, in order to reinforce threat inducement, 
the participants completed a second phase of the study, in which they read another news 
article and completed a questionnaire, two days after their participation in the first phase.  
However, a repeated-measures ANOVA with time (Phase1/Phase2) as a within-subjects 
factor, message position and subject position as between-subjects factors, and degree of 
threat as a criterion variable indicated the level of threat was not significantly different 
between Phase1 and Phase2, F (1, 281) = .10, p = .75.  Although the degree of threat 
was higher in the Phase 2 for those participants with threat inducement, the difference 
was not statistically significant, F (1, 281) = 2.63, p = .11, η2 = .01.  In addition, other 
DVs – behavioral intention and attitude toward restrictions – in the two phases were 
compared respectively in order to examine if there were any significant differences 
between the two phases in terms of the DVs.  No statistically significant differences 
were observed, tbehavior (288) = -.50, p = .62; tattitude (288) = .07, p = .94.  Other 
differences between the groups and relationships among the variables that had been 
hypothesized did not show significant differences between the two phases.  As the level 
of threat was not heightened, and no other DVs, group differences, and relationships 
among variables changed significantly in the second phase, only the data from the first 
phase were used for the analyses that follow.  
Also, as the half of the groups who were exposed to threat-inducing news article 
did not show significant differences from the other half with no threat-inducement in 
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terms of the threat level, F (1, 323) = 2.29, p = .13, η2 < .01, they were collapsed into 
each message position group.   
Before data analyses, those who did not give the correct answer for a reading 
comprehension question were excluded from the analyses.  If a participant did not 
understand which side (i.e., pro-restriction or anti-restriction) the majority was reported 
to support, it would be problematic to assume the perceived effect of the message 
position was properly measured.  Therefore, the reading comprehension question asked 
the participants which position on the government restrictions on violent TV 
programming the majority supported according to the news article they read.  Sixty-one 
out of 431 (14%) participants did not give the correct answer.    
As mentioned in the previous section, the participants were assigned to one of 
the two subject position groups -- pro-restriction/anti-restriction -- depending on their 
attitude score.  The participants with the attitude score lower than 4.1 (mean attitude 
score) were categorized as the pro-restriction group while those with the attitude score 
of 4.1 or higher were categorized as the anti-restriction group.   
In addition, the time taken by the participants to complete the first phase of the 
study was examined (M = 16 min., SD = 8 min.).  The cases with less than five minutes 
and more than 50 minutes were excluded from the analyses because five minutes was 
considered below the minimum time to competently complete the questionnaire and 50 
minutes was approximately 4 SD above the mean.  The final sample included 331 cases 
with 177 in the pro-restriction subject position group and 154 in the anti-restriction 
subject position group.  
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There were no significant differences between the original and final samples in 
terms of age (original sample: M = 19.8, SD = 1.96; final sample: M = 19.9, SD = 1.44), 
sex (original sample: female 62.4%; final sample: female 61.6%), and ethnicity 
(original sample: White 77.6%; final sample: White 79.2%).   
Data Analyses  
For a manipulation check, an independent samples t-test was conducted.  The 
responses to the manipulation check item, perceived orientation of report, were 
compared by two message position groups – pro-restriction vs. anti-restriction.  As 
intended, subjects in the pro-restriction message position group evaluated the news 
article they read as more pro-restriction oriented (M = 4.93, SE = .11) than subjects in 
the anti-restriction message position group (M = 3.77, SE = .13); t (329) = 7.12, p < .001, 
d = .79).  
To test whether the exposure to a news report of opinion poll results affects 
people’s attitudes toward the government restrictions on violent TV programming (H1), 
a repeated-measures ANOVA with time (pre/post-stimulus) as a within-subjects factor 
and attitude toward restrictions as a criterion variable was conducted.  The results 
indicate a significant main effect of time on the attitude toward restrictions, F (1, 330) = 
14.78, p < .001, η2 = .04.  The participants became less supportive toward the 
restrictions after their exposure to the news articles (Mpre = 4.05, SE = .07; Mpost = 3.83, 
SE = .08).  Hence, H1 was supported.   
In order to test the HMP that opposing parties would be more likely to perceive 
the news article that is inconsistent with their own opinion as biased (H2), an ANOVA 
with message-participant inconsistency as a between-subjects factor and HMP as a 
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dependent variable was performed.  Unlike the prediction, however, the participants 
were not more likely to perceive the news report that was inconsistent with their own 
view as biased (Mconsistent = 4.86, SE = .12; Minconsistent = 4.60, SE = 11), F (1, 329) = 
2.62, p = .11, η2 < .01.  Thus, H2 was not supported. 
In order to test H3a/H3b and H4, a repeated-measures ANOVA using others as 
a within-subjects factor and message position, subject position, and involvement as 
between-subjects factors was conducted.  TPP was entered as a criterion variable.  The 
results indicate the 3-way interaction not statistically significant, F (1, 323) = .02, p 
= .90, η2 < .01. (see Table 1).   
The 3-way interaction effect among message position, subject position, and 
others proposed in H3a/H3b was based on past research indicating TPP of a desirable 
message is greater for the in-group than for the out-group.  On the other hand, TPP of 
an undesirable message is greater for the out-group than for the in-group.  In that the 
desirability of a message is subjective depending on the participants’ view on the issue, 
it was assumed the participants would evaluate a message that is consistent with their 
own view as more desirable while evaluating a message that is inconsistent with their 
own view as more undesirable.  In the test of H3a and H3b, H3a was to test the case 
with a more desirable message, which is consistent with the participants’ view.  H3b 
was to test the case with a more undesirable message, which is inconsistent with the 
participants’ view.   
H3a predicted those who read the news articles of opinion polls indicating the 
majority supports their own view (message-subject consistency) would show a smaller 
TPP for the opponents of their view than for the supporters of their view.  That is, those 
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who favor government restrictions and read a pro-restriction article would exhibit a 
smaller TPP for opponents of restriction when compared to supporters of restriction.  
Those who are opposed to restriction and read an anti-restriction article would exhibit a 
smaller TPP for supporters of restriction when compared to opponents of restriction. 
However, in the present study, opponents of the restrictions who read the anti-
restriction article showed a greater TPP for supporters (M = 1.14, SE = .24) than for 
opponents (M = -.39, SE = .23).  Supporters of the restrictions who read the pro-
restrictions article showed a smaller TPP – the first-person perception -- for opponents 
(M = -1.39, SE = .21) than for supporters (M = 1.02, SE = .21) (see Figure 1).  Thus, 
H3a was supported only among the supporters of the restrictions.   
For additional information, opponents of the restrictions who read the anti-
restriction article perceived supporters of the restrictions would be influenced toward 
the restriction most (M = 4.70, SE = .20), they themselves would be influenced next (M 
= 3.56, SE = .18), and opponents of the restrictions would be influenced least (M = 3.17, 
SE = .24).  Supporters of the restrictions who read the pro-restriction article perceived 
supporters of the restrictions would be influenced toward the restriction most (M = 5.68, 
SE = .18), they themselves would be influenced next (M = 4.65, SE = .16), and 
opponents of the restrictions would be influenced least (M = 3.26, SE = .17).  
H3b predicted those who read the news articles reporting the majority supports 
the opposite position from their own view (message-subject inconsistency) would show 
a greater TPP for the opponents of their view than for the supporters of their own view:  
Those who favor government restriction and read an anti-restriction article would 
exhibit a greater TPP for opponents of restriction when compared to supporters of 
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restriction; Those who are opposed to restriction and read a pro-restriction article would 
exhibit a greater TPP for supporters of restriction when compared to opponents of 
restriction.   
The results indicate opponents of the restrictions who read the pro-restriction 
article showed a greater TPP for supporters (M = 2.24, SE = .20) than for opponents of 
the restrictions (M = -.36, SE = .19), supporting the hypothesis.  However, supporters of 
the restrictions who read the anti-restriction article showed a smaller TPP – the first-
person perception -- for opponents (M = -.80, SE = .19) than for supporters (M = .72, SE 
= .20) (see Figure 1).  Hence, H3b was supported only among the opponents of the 
restrictions. 
H4 predicted the moderating effect of involvement on the 3-way interaction 
among message position, subject position, and others in terms of the TPP.  Highly 
involved individuals were expected to show a greater differential TPP.  However, the 
results of the repeated-measures ANOVA demonstrate the 4-way interaction among 
involvement, message position, subject position, and others was not statistically 
significant, F (1, 323) = .65, p = .42, η2 < .01 (see Table 1).  Hence, H4 was not 
supported.     
The moderating effects of message-subject inconsistency on the relationships 
between the TPP and its consequences were proposed in H5a and H5b.  In order to 
examine these hypotheses, two separate regression analyses were conducted.  Message-
subject inconsistency, TPP for supporters, TPP for opponents, interaction between 
message-subject inconsistency and TPP for supporters, and interaction between 
message-subject inconsistency and TPP for opponents were entered as predictors.  
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Behavioral intention change and attitudinal change were entered as a dependent variable 
respectively.        
H5a predicted the moderating role of message-subject inconsistency on the 
relationship between the TPPs and behavioral intention change such that the 
relationship is stronger when the participants read a news article that is inconsistent 
with their own position.  However, as Table 2 indicates, the interactions between the 
TPPs and message-subject inconsistency on behavioral intention change were not 
statistically significant.  Hence, H5a was not supported.    
H5b predicted the moderating role of message-subject inconsistency on the 
relationship between the TPPs and attitudinal change such that the relationship is 
stronger when the participants read a news article that is inconsistent with their own 
position.  Results of the regression analysis demonstrate the interaction between the 
TPP for supporters and message-subject inconsistency was close to significance (β = .18, 
p = .09) (see Table 3).  However, unlike the prediction, the association was stronger in 
the case of message-subject consistency rather than message-subject inconsistency (see 
Figure 2).  The interaction between the TPP for opponents and message-subject 
inconsistency was not statistically significant (see Table 3).  Thus, H5b was not 
supported.        
To examine the mediating roles of threat (H6a/H6b) and anxiety (H7a/H7b) on 
the relationships between the TPPs and behavioral intention change and attitudinal 
change, regression analyses were performed with the TPPs and degree of threat/anxiety 
as predictors and behavioral intention change and attitudinal change as a dependent 
variable respectively.  Baron and Kenny (1986) suggest the following steps to test 
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mediation: (a) the independent variable (IV) is significantly related to the dependent 
variable (DV); (b) the IV is significantly related to the mediator; and (c) when the IV 
and the mediator are both used to predict the DV, the mediator should be a significant 
predictor, and the relationship between the IV and the DV should decrease (partial 
mediation) or should be reduced to be non-significant (full mediation).  However, 
according to Hayes (2009), even if an IV is not related to a DV, it is possible for a 
mediator to be causally between the IV and the DV.  That is, an IV can exert an indirect 
effect on a DV through a mediator without a significant association between the IV and 
DV.  A total effect can be the sum of many different paths of direct and indirect effects, 
but not all of the paths may be included in the model.  For example, if two or more 
indirect effects exist between the IV and DV and the effects work in the opposite 
directions, the association between the IV and DV might be nonsignificant.  Therefore, 
if researchers stop testing the indirect effect because the association between the IV and 
DV is not significant, the indirect effect cannot be detected even though the effect 
actually exists.  Although the Sobel test is recommended as an inferential technique to 
test indirect effects, it requires the assumption that the sampling distribution of the 
indirect effect is normal (Hayes, 2009).  Given the relatively small size of the sample 
used in the current study, it did not seem appropriate to use the Sobel test.  Thus, in the 
following analyses, whether 1) the threat and anxiety are predicted by the IVs and 2) the 
threat and anxiety predict the DV were examined regardless of the significance of the 
associations between the IVs and the DV.   
First, whether threat mediates the associations between the TPPs and behavioral 
intention change was tested by two regression analyses.  A regression analysis with the 
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TPPs as IVs and degree of threat as a DV showed the TPPs were significantly related 
with degree of threat (β = .17, p < .01 for TPP for supporters; β = .16, p < .01 for TPP 
for opponents) (see Table 4).  However, another regression analysis with the TPPs and 
degree of threat as IVs and behavioral intention change as a DV indicates degree of 
threat was not a significant predictor of the behavioral intention change controlling for 
the TPPs (β = .02, p = .74) (see Table 5 and Figure 3).  With attitudinal change as a DV, 
degree of threat was not a significant predictor of attitudinal change controlling for the 
TPPs (β = -.08, p = .13), either (see Table 6 and Figure 4).  Hence, H6a and H6b were 
not supported.  
Next, the mediation of anxiety on the associations between the TPPs and its 
consequences was tested.  The results of a regression analysis with the TPPs as IVs and 
degree of anxiety as a DV demonstrated the TPPs were significantly related with degree 
of anxiety (β = .19, p < .01 with TPP for supporters; β = .12, p < .05 with TPP for 
opponents).  Another regression analysis with the TPPs and degree of anxiety as IVs 
and behavioral intention change as a DV was conducted.  The results indicate degree of 
anxiety was not significantly associated with the DV controlling for the TPPs (β = -.01, 
p = .85).  Therefore, H7a was not supported (see Figure 5).  On the other hand, with 
attitudinal change as a DV, degree of anxiety was statistically significantly associated 
with the DV controlling for the TPPs (β = -.12, p < .05).  H7b was supported (see 
Figure 6).  
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Discussion 
Issues on Findings 
This study investigated the differential TPP of the news reports of opinion poll 
results by subject position, message position, and others position and how the TPP is 
related with attitudinal change and behavioral intention change.  The findings 
demonstrate participants’ attitude toward the government restrictions on violent TV 
programming changed after they read a news report of opinion poll results (H1).  The 
relative HME on the news report of opinion poll results was not supported by the data 
(H2). The subject position, message position, and others’ position on the TPP did not 
interact with one another (H3a/H3b).  H3a was supported only among the supporters of 
the restrictions.  H3b was supported only among the opponents of the restrictions.  The 
moderating effect of involvement on the 3-way interaction (H4) was not supported.  The 
moderating effect of message-subject consistency on the relationship between the TPPs 
and behavioral intention change/attitudinal change was not confirmed (H5a/H5b).  
Regarding the mediating role of threat and anxiety on the relationship between the TPP 
and attitudinal change, anxiety partially mediated the relationship while threat did not 
(H6b/H7b).  The mediating roles of threat and anxiety on the relationship between the 
TPP and behavioral intention change were not supported as threat and anxiety were not 
statistically associated with the behavioral intention change (H6a/H7a).                        
In the current chapter, several additional issues regarding the results are 
discussed.  First of all, the attitude change of the respondents after their exposure to the 
message is further examined.  The results of the repeated-measures ANOVA with time 
(pre/post-stimulus) as a within-subjects factor indicate participants’ attitude toward the 
 60 
 
government restrictions on violent TV programming changed after they read a news 
report of opinion poll results (H1).  Two between-subjects factors – message position 
and subject position – were added to the analysis in order to examine whether message 
position and/or subject position affect the attitudinal change.  The results of the 
repeated-measure ANOVA with message position and subject position as between-
subjects factors and time as a within-subjects factor indicate the interaction between 
time and attitude is statistically significant, F (1, 327) = 16.76, p < .001, η2 = .05.  The 
participants who favored the government restrictions became less supportive toward the 
restrictions after their exposure to the message regardless of the message position (Mpre 
= 5.03, SE = .06; Mpost = 4.61, SE = .09).  On the other hand, those who were against the 
restrictions did not show any significant differences, (Mpre = 2.91, SE = .06; Mpost = 2.95, 
SE = .09).  The main effect of message position was not statistically significant, F (1, 
327) = .30, p = .59, and message position did not interact with subject position over 
time, F (1, 327) = .84, p = .36.  These results demonstrate the exposure to the message 
had impacts on the supporters of the restrictions, but the message position did not have 
a direct effect on the participants’ attitude change.  
In addition, according to Worchel and Brehm (1970) and Wright (1986), 
people’s attitude or view shifts away from a communication when the communication is 
pro-attitudinal.  When the communication is counter-attitudinal, the fact that they 
disagree with the communication establishes their freedom to hold a contrary position.  
On the other hand, those who initially agreed with the communication do not have the 
freedom to choose their own opinion, so they show higher levels of reactance relative to 
those who initially disagreed with the communication.  This theory might explain why 
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those who supported the restrictions became less supportive toward the restriction after 
their exposure to the pro-restriction article.     
The second issue is regarding why the relative HMP was not observed in the 
present study.  The HMP hypothesis predicted opposing parties would perceive the 
news article that was inconsistent with their own opinion as more biased (H2).  This 
relative HMP hypothesis was based on the assumption that regardless of whether news 
content is objectively neutral or not, opposing groups would show differential 
perception on how much the news article is biased (Gunther, Christen, Liebhart, & Chia, 
2001).  The opponents of the restrictions would perceive the pro-restriction article more 
biased than the proponents of the restrictions while the anti-restriction article would be 
perceived as more biased by the proponents than by the opponents of the restrictions.  
However, the results of the current study demonstrate the pro-restriction article 
reporting the majority is in favor of the restrictions was perceived as more inclined 
toward the restrictions by supporters of the restrictions (M = 5.52, SE = .11) than 
opponents the restrictions (M = 5.17, SE = .12).  The anti-restriction article reporting 
the majority is against the restrictions was perceived as neutral by both the proponents 
(M = 4.06, SE = .15) and the opponents of the restrictions (M = 4.00, SE = .18).   
A possible explanation is related with the type of involvement the participants 
had regarding the issue.  According to Choi, Yang, and Chang (2009), outcome-relevant 
involvement, which is elicited by the relevance of an issue to oneself, may lead to 
systematic processing of information.  Therefore, those with outcome-relevant 
involvement might not reject a message just because it is inconsistent with their own 
position (Choi et al., 2009).  In that HMP is a biased perception, people might be less 
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likely to show the HMP when they process messages more systematically.  In this study, 
the restrictions on violent TV programming might have elicited outcome-relevant 
involvement rather than value-relevant involvement among the participants who feel the 
issue as personally important.  If different issues that elicit value-relevant involvement 
rather than outcome-relevant involvement were chosen for the study, the HMP might 
have been manifested. 
The next issue involves the 3-way interaction among message position, subject 
position, and others on the TPP predicted in H3a and H3b.  The hypotheses were not 
fully supported.  The opponents of the restrictions who read the anti-restriction article 
were expected to show a greater TPP for their in-group than out-group, but the results 
indicate a greater TPP for supporters (out-group) than for opponents (in-group).  The 
supporters of the restrictions who read the anti-restriction article were expected to show 
a greater TPP for their out-group than in-group, but they showed a smaller TPP, actually 
the first-person perception, for the opponents (out-group) than supporters (in-group).  
The opponents of the restrictions showed a similar level of TPPs on the pro-restriction 
(M = -.36, SE = .19) and the anti-restriction articles (M = -.38, SE = .23) for their in-
group.   
This phenomenon might be partly explained by the fact that the opponents of the 
restrictions did not evaluate differently for the pro-restriction article (M = 3.50, SE 
= .15) and the anti-restriction article (M = 3.66, SE = .14), t (152) = -.74, p > .05.  The 
3-way interaction was predicted based on the assumption that the articles would be 
evaluated differently depending on the message-subject consistency.  If the news article 
was consistent with the participants’ position, it would be judged as more desirable and 
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acceptable, therefore, they would suppose in-group members, those who have the same 
view as theirs, would be more influenced by the article than out-group members.  
However, as the evaluations of the pro- and anti-restriction articles were not 
significantly different, particularly among the opponents of the restrictions, the 
differential TPP was not manifested.     
Interestingly, whereas the 3-way interaction was not supported, a 2-way 
interaction effect between others and message position was statistically significant, F (1, 
323) = 11.96, p < .01, η2 = .03.  The TPP for supporters of the restrictions was greater 
in the pro-restriction message position condition (M = 1.64, SE = .14) than in the anti-
restriction message position condition (M = .93, SE = .15).  The first person perception 
for opponents of the restrictions was also greater in the pro-restriction message position 
group (M = -.82, SE = .14) than in the anti-restriction message position group (M = -.60, 
SE = .15).  That is, supporters of the restrictions were perceived to be more susceptible 
to the pro-restriction article than the participants themselves while opponents of the 
restrictions were perceived to be less susceptible to the pro-restriction article than the 
participants themselves.  These results are consistent with the target corollary of TPE 
theory: Perceived susceptibility of a particular target group may affect the direction and 
magnitude of the TPP (Lambe & McLeod, 1995; Scharrer, 2002).  TPP is affected by 
people’s predisposition regarding the vulnerability of the target group on the message.  
These results suggest the perceived effect of a message is largely influenced by the 
perceiver’s predisposition on the message and its target group.     
While the interaction between message position and others was significant, there 
was no interaction between subject position and others.  This might be because the 
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participants did not fully identify themselves with their in-groups.  Although the attitude 
toward the government restrictions on violent TV programming was significantly 
different by subject position (M = 5.03, SE = .06 for the supporters; M = 2.93, SE = .07 
for the opponents), t (329) = 24.53, p < .001, it is possible that the participants in the 
pro-restriction subject position group did not identify themselves as the members of the 
group of supporters of the restrictions, and they did not perceive opponents of the 
restrictions as their out-group.  According to the social identity theory, the salience of a 
group membership is one of the core components of the formation and effect of the 
social identity (Tajfel, 1982).  The effect of in-group favorableness increases as the size 
of the in-group decreases and the salience of in-group membership increases (Gerard & 
Hoyt, 1974).  In the current study, the participants might not have had a strong sense of 
in-group membership.  The concept of the “supporters of the restrictions” might have 
been too vague or abstract to be considered as an in-group.  Moreover, they would not 
have had any motivation to identify themselves as supporters or opponents of the 
restrictions.  Therefore, the lack of sense of in-group membership might have caused 
the non-differential TPP by subject position and others.  
Another possible explanation involves emotional involvement.  Ellemers, 
Kortekaas, and Ouwerkerk (1999) assert people are more likely to identify with a 
particular social group when they feel affective commitment to the group.  According to 
Ellemers and colleagues, although cognitive awareness that they are members of certain 
group – self-categorization – is one component of social identity theory, the emotional 
involvement or commitment result in differential responses in terms of in-group 
identification.  In the current study, it is possible the participants did not feel sufficient 
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emotional involvement with the presumed in-group although they recognized that they 
were closer to the group.  That is, their affective commitment was not enough for them 
to identify themselves with a certain group. 
The next issue is concerned with behavioral intention change.  In the present 
study, participants did not change their behavioral intention while their attitude changed.  
The results of a repeated-measures ANOVA with time (pre/post-stimulus) as a within-
subjects factor, message position and subject position as between-subjects factors and 
behavioral intention as DV demonstrate the participants’ behavioral intention did not 
change after their exposure to the news articles (Mpre = 3.09; Mpost = 3.06), F (1, 327) 
= .23, p = .63.  Furthermore, behavioral intention was not associated with the TPP.  It 
can be inferred the effect of the TPP on attitudinal change was not linked to behavioral 
intention change.  The TPP of the stimuli might not have been enough to affect the 
moderately involved college students to change their behavioral intention.   
It is also possible that, as Glynn and colleagues (2004) point out, the attitude 
measure and the behavioral intention measure may not have been measuring what they 
were intended to.  For example, the attitude toward the government restrictions might 
be different from the attitude toward the actual behaviors to support the government 
restrictions such as signing a petition or calling a TV station.  If attitudes toward the 
behaviors to support the government restrictions were asked separately, the attitudinal 
change might have been better linked to the behavioral intention change.      
The next issue is related with psychological reactance.  Psychological reactance, 
measured by threat, was expected to help explain the linkage between the TPP and its 
behavioral consequences – behavioral intention change and attitudinal change 
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(H6a/H6b).  However, the results indicate threat did not mediate the associations 
between the TPP and behavioral intention change and attitudinal change.  Past research 
on this psychological reactance and the relationship between TPP and voting behavior 
in the context of political advertising found psychological reactance to political 
advertising was greater for out-group candidate ads than for in-group candidate ads 
(Meirick, et al., 2010).  Meirick and colleagues (2010) also found a positive relationship 
between reactance and the TPP for out-group members on out-group candidate ads, 
controlling for candidate favorability and political knowledge.  In that voting could be 
an action for freedom restoration in the political context, it can be predicted the effect of 
TPP on voting behavior would be mediated by the psychological reactance.  On the 
other hand, the results of the current study demonstrate threat was not associated with 
attitudinal change controlling for the TPPs although the TPP was associated with threat.   
This inconsistency between the results of the present study and the past study 
might result from the use of different measures of reactance.  In the current study, 
reactance was measured by three items asking perceived threat of the article on the 
freedom to choose an opinion.  However, Meirick and colleagues measured reactance 
with four items asking perceived threat on the freedom in general.  It is possible the 
level of threat on the specific issue stayed under consciousness, so the variation of 
threat was not enough to be detected in the association with the behavioral intention 
change and attitudinal change.      
Finally, the findings of the present study support the prediction that anxiety 
mediates the association between the TPP and attitudinal change.  The perception that a 
message would have influence on others to become more favorable toward the 
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restrictions than on the participants themselves – the TPP of the message – was 
significantly related with the participants’ attitude change, and anxiety mediated the 
relationship.  Additional analyses indicate the mediation was statistically significant 
only among the opponents of the restrictions (see Figure 7).  The associations among 
the variables were examined separately for the supporters and opponents of the 
restrictions.  The results demonstrate the TPPs were not statistically significantly 
associated with anxiety among the supporters of the restrictions (β = .07, p = .33 for 
TPP for supporters; β = .06, p = .40 for TPP for opponents).  On the other hand, among 
the opponents of the restrictions, the TPP on supporters of the restrictions was 
significantly associated with the anxiety (β = .21, p < .01).  The opponents of the 
restrictions who perceived that supporters of the restrictions would be more influenced 
toward the restrictions (those who showed a higher TPP on the supporters) were likely 
to become more anxious.  And, those with higher anxiety were more likely to become 
less supportive of the restrictions (to reinforce their opposition to the restrictions) (β = -
.20, p < .05).  It should be noted anxiety is involved in the association between the TPP 
and attitudinal change as a mediator or motivator only among the opponents of the 
restrictions.           
Limitations of the Study  
 There are several limitations of the study.  First of all, the study was conducted 
in only one context – government restrictions on violent TV programming.  If more 
issues that elicit different types of involvements such as value-relevant involvement and 
different levels of involvement such as higher involvement were included in the study, 
it would have been possible to compare the results and draw a conclusion regarding 
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whether the prepositions on the HMP and the differential TPP were not supported 
because the issue elicited a wrong kind of involvement or due to lack of involvement. 
For future research, more studies examining the TPE in diverse contexts with different 
types and levels of involvement and different types of emotion are suggested. 
 Another limitation of the study is that the self-reported behavioral intention 
change might not be the same as the actual behavioral change.  Also, the attitude 
measured in the current study might not be able to be considered as one of the 
behavioral consequences of TPP.  However, participants’ action of responding to the 
question on their attitude itself could be considered as a kind of behavior.  The behavior 
of expressing their opinion should have been brought about through some psychological 
processes after their exposure to a message (Glynn et al., 2004).  In this sense, 
attitudinal change should be able to be considered as one of the behavioral outcomes of 
the TPP.   
 In addition, Pearson’s correlation coefficients between the measures revealed 
degree of threat and degree of anxiety are highly correlated with each other (r = .54, p 
< .01) (see Table 8).  Although it is hard to completely separate one type of affect from 
the other, it would be necessary to clearly define these two measures so that the problem 
of whether it is anxiety or threat that mediates the relationship between TPP and its 
consequences or both could be resolved.    
Contribution to Theory  
 Despite the limitations, the current study contributes to the TPE research by 
revealing the role of anxiety as a mediator in the linkage between TPP and attitudinal 
change.  There has not been any previous research that confirmed the mediating role of 
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any type of affect in the relationship.  Given the inconsistent findings on the linkage 
between TPP and its consequences, the investigation of other external factors 
influencing the relationship should be meaningful.   
  In addition, the present study attempted to induce stronger threat among the 
participants by adding a phrase indicating more urgent threat and another phase of the 
study but the findings indicate these methods employed did not influence the threat 
level.  These findings might be helpful for future research that requires threat induction 
or management in the context of news coverage on social issues.      
Conclusion 
In that poll results are expected to represent what is the public opinion on 
dominant issues in the society (Lewis, 2001), the news reports of poll results may 
function as a kind of agenda setter (Higgins, 2008).  Nonetheless, the direct effect of the 
poll results has been debated for several decades (de Vreese & Semetko, 2002; 
Hardmeier, & Roth, 2001; Lang & Lang, 1984; Mendelsohn & Crespi, 1970; Navazio, 
1977).  The present study approaches the effect of the public opinion poll reports from 
the perspective of TPE.  Given the past research on the TPP and its consequences, it 
should be reasonable to assume TPP of the news reports of opinion poll results would 
have effects on individuals’ attitudes on social issues and policies, which, in turn, would 
affect public opinion.  Thus, this study examined the differential TPP of the opinion poll 
reports and whether and how this is associated with individuals’ attitude change on the 
government restrictions on violent TV programming.  
The findings of the present study indicate the participants’ attitude on the issue 
changed after their exposure to the opinion poll results, and the change was associated 
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with TPP.  More interestingly, the association between the TPP and the attitudinal 
change was mediated by anxiety: The participants with greater TPP were more likely to 
become anxious, and those with higher anxiety, in turn, were more likely to change 
their attitude.  As emotions are not separate from cognition but integrated with it in 
almost every human activity (Lazarus, Coyne, & Folkman, 1984; Plutchik, 1962), it is 
no wonder emotions play an important role in the formulation and expression of public 
opinion (Glynn et al., 2004).  Particularly, anxiety has been studied as an important 
concept in psychological theory and research (Izard, 1977).  Some scholars in political 
science also have noticed anxiety as one of the influential affects in political arena 
(Marcus & Mackuen, 1993; Marcus et al., 2000).  The present study demonstrates the 
motivating role of anxiety in the relationship between the TPP and its consequences.     
It should also be noted message position and others position interacted with each 
other.  According to the target corollary of TPE theory, perceived susceptibility of a 
particular target group may affect the direction and magnitude of the TPP (Lambe & 
McLeod, 1995; Scharrer, 2002).  The findings in the current study indicate supporters of 
the restrictions were perceived to be more susceptible to the pro-restriction article than 
the participants themselves while opponents of the restrictions were perceived to be less 
susceptible to the pro-restriction article than the participants themselves.  In addition, 
when mediated information or messages are not consistent with their pre-existing moral, 
culture, standards, or attitudes, people tend to feel anxious and intend to remove the 
uneasiness by rejecting or condemning the source.  Likewise, people tend to accuse 
public opinion polls of being biased and bad influence on others when the results are 
different from their own values and standards.  That is, TPP is affected by people’s 
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predisposition regarding the target group and the message.  These results demonstrate 
the predisposition of the human mind affects people’s perception of media influence.  In 
this sense it should be true “every opinion is a marriage of information and 
predisposition: information to form a mental picture of the given issue, and 
predisposition to motivate some conclusion about it” (Zaller, 1992, p. 6).     
For future research, further endeavor could be made to examine whether and 
how some other types of emotions affect the TPE.  In addition, the association between 
the TPP and its consequences could be examined in diverse contexts with different 
types and levels of involvement.  Some results of the current study are not clear-cut and 
there is the possibility that the involvement type and level elicited in the study was not 
appropriate.  If the associations between the TPP and its consequences can be compared 
in the contexts with different types (i.e., value-relevant involvement vs. outcome-
relevant involvement) and levels (i.e., high-involvement vs. low-involvement) of 
involvement, whether the pattern of the association is clearly manifested in different 
contexts could be clarified.      
Despite the limitations previously mentioned, the present study contributes to 
the TPE research by confirming people’s predisposition on a message and its target 
group affects the perceived effect of the message and revealing human emotion, 
particularly anxiety, plays a role as a mediator in the association between the TPP and 
attitudinal change.    
 72 
 
Endnote 
1
 As people usually have multiple group memberships that vary in terms of relative 
importance in the self-concept, salience of a group membership comes up as one of the 
core components of the social identity theory.  To the extent that an individual’s social 
identification is salient in a particular context, the individual recognizes features 
distinguishing the own group from other groups (Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Tajfel, 1982), 
and “self-perception and conduct become in-group stereotypical and normative” (Hogg 
et al., 1995, p. 260).  If the existence of other groups has little psychological impact on 
individuals, or the individuals’ membership of their own group is not important for 
them, group distinctiveness does not influence “the formation of the self-image or of a 
‘positive social identity’” (Tajfel, 1982, p. 491).  Thus, the ‘salience’ of in- and out- 
group, intergroup relations, is a theoretical baseline of the theory (Tajfel, 1982).  
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Table 1  
Effects of Interactions among the Factors of the TPP  
 Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. Eta 
Squared 
Others 605.00 1 605.00 203.87 < 0.01 0.38 
Others x Att 0.08 1 0.08 0.03 0.87 < 0.01 
Others x News 33.89 1 33.89 11.42 < 0.01 0.02 
Others x Invl 0.83 1 0.83 0.28 0.60 < 0.01 
Others x Att x News 0.05 1 0.05 0.02 0.90 < 0.01 
Others x Att x Invl 1.51 1 1.51 0.51 0.48 < 0.01 
Others x News x Invl 0.13 1 0.13 0.04 0.84 < 0.01 
Others x Att * News *  Invl 1.94 1 1.94 0.65 0.42 < 0.01 
Error (others) 958.55 323 2.97    
Note. Tests of within-subjects effects. “Others” indicate perceived effects on 
proponents/opponents of the restrictions, “Att” indicates subject position (pro-/anti-
restriction), “News” indicates message position (pro-/anti-restriction), and “Invl” 
indicates high/low involvement.  
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Table 2  
Behavioral Intention Change by TPP and Message-Subject Inconsistency   
 Behavioral Intention Change 
Variable B Beta 
Constant 0.05 (0.10)  
Inconsistency -0.11 (0.13) -0.06 
TPP_S < 0.01 (0.04) -0.01 
TPP_O 0.03 (0.05)  0.07 
TPP_S * Inconsistency -0.01 (0.05) -0.02 
TPP_O* Inconsistency -0.05 (0.06) -0.09 
R2 0.01 
Adjusted R2 < 0.01 
F 0.37 
Note:  Numbers in ( ) are standard errors.  
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Table 3   
Attitudinal Change by TPP and Message-Subject Inconsistency   
 Attitudinal Change 
Variable B Beta 
Constant -0.05 (0.12)  
Inconsistency -0.20 (0.15) -0.10 
TPP_S -0.15 (0.05)     -0.28** 
TPP_O -0.07 (0.05) -0.12 
TPP_S * Inconsistency  0.11 (0.06)    0.18* 
TPP_O* Inconsistency -0.01 (0.06)  -0.01 
R2 0.06 
Adjusted R2 0.05 
F     4.12** 
Note:  Numbers in ( ) are standard errors.   
*p < .10, ** p < .01.  
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Table 4   
Relationship between the TPPs and Threat    
 Threat 
Variable B Beta 
Constant 2.86 (0.11)  
TPP_S 0.13 (0.04) 0.17* 
TPP_O 0.13 (0.04) 0.16* 
R2 0.07 
Adjusted R2 0.06 
F     11.61** 
Note:  Numbers in ( ) are standard errors.   
*p < .01, ** p < .001.  
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Table 5    
Effect of Threat on Behavioral Intention Change    
 Behavioral Intention Change 
Variable B Beta 
Constant -0.06 (0.12)  
TPP_S -0.01 (0.03) -0.03 
TPP_O -0.01 (0.03)  0.01 
Threat           0.01 (0.03)                           0.02 
R2 < 0.001 
Adjusted R2 < 0.001 
F  0.11 
Note:  Numbers in ( ) are standard errors.   
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Table 6    
Effect of Threat on Attitudinal Change    
 Attitudinal Change 
Variable B Beta 
Constant -0.01 (0.13)  
TPP_S -0.07 (0.03) -0.14* 
TPP_O -0.07 (0.03) -0.13* 
Threat          -0.06 (0.04)                         -0.08 
R2 0.06 
Adjusted R2 0.05 
F     6.52** 
Note:  Numbers in ( ) are standard errors. 
*p < .05, ** p < .001.
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Table 7  
Differential Attitudinal Change by Subject Position    
Attitude Time M S.E. 
Pro-restriction Before 5.03 .06 
 After 4.60 .08 
Anti-restriction Before 2.93 .06 
 After 2.94 .09 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 
Correlations between Measures  
 
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01.  ATT = Attitudinal change, BHV = Behavioral intention change, TPP_S = Third-person 
perception for the supporters of the restrictions, TPP_O = Third-person perception for the opponents of the restrictions, 
SELF = Perceived influence on self, SUPP = Perceived influence on supporters of the restrictions, OPP = Perceived 
influence on opponents of the restrictions, INVL = Involvement, ORNT = Perceived orientation of report, HMP = 
Hostile media perception, THRT = Degree of threat, EVAL = Evaluation of article, ANX = Degree of anxiety. 
Standard deviations reported in parentheses.    
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. ATT (1.05) 0.13* -0.18** -0.17** 0.29** 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.09 -0.03 -0.14* 0.23** -0.16** 
2. BHV  (0.89) -0.02 -0.01 0.08 0.05 0.06 -0.14* 0.13* 0.19** 0.01 0.18** -0.02 
3. TPP_S   (1.96) 0.18** -0.59** 0.68** -0.36** -0.13* 0.05 0.16** 0.20** -0.14* 0.21** 
4. TPP_O    (1.88) -0.62** -0.35** 0.64** -0.12* -0.09 -0.06 0.19** -0.26** 0.15** 
5. SELF     (1.47) 0.19** 0.20** 0.12* 0.24** 0.13* -0.25** 0.35** -0.26** 
6. SUPP      (1.61) -0.25** -0.04 0.28** 0.32** 0.02 0.16** 0.01 
7. OPP       (1.50) -0.03 0.12* 0.05 0.00 0.03 -0.07 
8. INVL        (0.90) -0.03 -0.04 0.04 0.03 0.07 
9. ORNT         (1.59) 0.47** -0.01 0.13* 0.03 
10. HMP          (1.52) 0.08 0.16** 0.15** 
11. THRT           (1.53) -0.32** 0.54** 
12. EVAL            (1.15) -0.28** 
13. ANX             (1.37) 
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Figure 1. Message-Subject Position, Others, and Message Position on TPP 
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Figure 2. Association between TPP and Attitudinal Change  
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Note: TPP_S: Third-person perception on proponents of the government restrictions on 
violent TV programming, TPP_O: Third-person perception on opponents of the 
government restrictions on violent TV programming 
* p < .01 
 
Figure 3. Mediation of Threat between TPPs and Behavioral Intention Change 
β = .17* 
β = .16* 
 
         TPP_S 
 
         TPP_O 
 
         Threat 
        Behavioral   
Intention Change 
β = .02 
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Note: TPP_S: Third-person perception on proponents of the government restrictions on 
violent TV programming, TPP_O: Third-person perception on opponents of the 
government restrictions on violent TV programming 
* p < .01 
 
Figure 4. Mediation of Threat between TPPs and Attitudinal Change 
β = .17* 
β = .16* 
β = -.08 
 
         TPP_S 
 
         TPP_O 
 
         Threat 
      Attitudinal                       
         Change 
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Note: TPP_S: Third-person perception on proponents of the government restrictions on 
violent TV programming, TPP_O: Third-person perception on opponents of the 
government restrictions on violent TV programming 
* p < .05, ** p < .01. 
 
Figure 5. Mediation of Anxiety between TPPs and Behavioral Intention Change 
β = .19** 
β = .12* 
 
         TPP_S 
 
         TPP_O 
 
         Anxiety 
     Behavioral 
Intention Change 
β = -.01 
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Note: TPP_S: Third-person perception on proponents of the government restrictions on 
violent TV programming, TPP_O: Third-person perception on opponents of the 
government restrictions on violent TV programming 
* p < .05, ** p < .01.  
 
Figure 6. Mediation of Anxiety between TPPs and Attitudinal Change 
 
β = .19** 
β = .12* 
 
         TPP_S 
 
         TPP_O 
 
         Anxiety 
      Attitudinal     
         Change 
β = -.12* 
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a. Supporters of the Restrictions 
 
Note: TPP_S: Third-person perception on proponents of the government restrictions on 
violent TV programming, TPP_O: Third-person perception on opponents of the 
government restrictions on violent TV programming 
* p < .05 
 
b. Opponents of the Restrictions 
 
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
Figure 7. Anxiety as Mediator by Subject Position 
β = .21** 
β = .12 
β = -.20* 
 
         TPP_S 
 
         TPP_O 
 
         Anxiety 
       Attitudinal  
          Change 
β = .07 
β = .06 
β = -.12 
 
         TPP_S 
 
         TPP_O 
 
         Anxiety 
       Attitudinal  
          Change 
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Appendix A: Questionnaire 
Pre-Stimulus Questionnaire 
 
LAST 4 DIGIT OF STUDENT ID: ___ ___ ___ ___ 
 
 
Section 1. This section asks you to provide some basic demographic information.  
 
1.  Sex Male    Female   (please check one) 
 
2. Age    (in years) 
 
3. What race do you consider yourself? (check one) 
 
African-American    Asian- or Pacific Islander    
  
Native American     Non-Hispanic White    
   
Spanish or Hispanic Origin                   Multi-racial or mixed race    
 
 
Section 2. This section is about your attitudes and behavior towards the government restrictions 
on violent TV content.   
1. How do you think about the government restrictions on violent TV content in terms of 
wrong/right, negative/positive, unfavorable/favorable, unacceptable/acceptable, foolish/wise, 
and bad/good? (a “4” response reflects neutrality when comparing the two extremes of each 
pairing) 
1) wrong 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 right 
2) negative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 positive 
3) unfavorable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 favorable 
4) unacceptable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 acceptable 
5) foolish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 wise 
6) bad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 good 
2. How important TO YOU is the issue of restricting violent TV content, whether you support it 
or not? Please read each pair and circle the number that best describes your response to the 
question (a “4” response reflects neutrality when comparing the two extremes of each pairing) 
1) unimportant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 important 
2) relevant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 irrelevant 
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3) consequential 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 inconsequential 
4) insignificant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 significant 
3. How do you think about violent TV content?  Please read each pair and circle the number that 
best describes your response to the question (a “4” response reflects neutrality when comparing 
the two extremes of each pairing) 
1) unpleasant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 pleasant 
2) pleasurable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 unpleasurable 
3) punishing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 not punishing 
4) satisfying 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 unsatisfying 
Section 3.  Please indicate how much you support each of the following statements.  
1. Violent content should be banned from television show during hours when children might be 
watching.  
Not support at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly support 
2. Violent content should be banned from television show during any time of the day. 
Not support at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly support 
3. Violent content should be self-censored by broadcasting companies.  
Not support at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly support 
 
Section 4.  Please indicate how much you agree with each of the following statements.  
1. I would sign a petition for regulating violent television programming.  
Not agree at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
2. I would e-mail or call a television station or government agency to complain about 
violent content on television. 
Not agree at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
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3. I would say that violent content should be banned from television show during hours 
when children might be watching if I am asked for a survey on the issue.  
Not agree at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
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Post-stimulus Questionnaire 
 
LAST 4 DIGIT OF STUDENT ID: ___ ___ ___ ___ 
 
 
 
Section 1. After viewing the news article, what emotions do you feel toward the 
government restrictions on violent TV programming? 
 
  Not at all      Very much 
Afraid   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Feel Threatened 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Worried  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Section 2.  This section is about the news article you read. Please indicate how much 
you agree/disagree with each of the following statements.  
1.  I feel the news article tries to manipulate me on the issue.  
strongly disagree -3 -2 1 0 1 2 3 Strongly agree 
2.  I feel the news article tries to pressure me on the issue.  
strongly disagree -3 -2 1 0 1 2 3 Strongly agree 
3.  I feel the news article threatens my freedom to choose my own opinion on the issue.  
strongly disagree -3 -2 1 0 1 2 3 Strongly agree 
 
 
Section 3.  How do you evaluate the news article you read?  Please read each pair and 
circle the number that best describes your response to the question (a “4” response 
reflects neutrality when comparing the two extremes of each pairing) 
 
1. like 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 dislike 
2. acceptable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 objectionable 
3. believable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 unbelievable 
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Section 4. This section asks more questions about the news article you read.  
1. After reading the news article, how do you think this article made you more or less 
toward the government restrictions on violent TV content? (Greater numbers indicate 
stronger influence. 0 means no influence.)  
Make me more                
Pro-freedom 
3 2 1 0 1 2 3 Make me 
more                   
Pro-
restriction 
2. How do you think this article would affect those who support the restrictions on 
violent TV content (pro-restriction)? (Greater numbers indicate stronger influence. 0 
means no influence.) 
More                  
Pro-freedom 
3 2 1 0 1 2 3 More                   
Pro-
restriction 
3. How do you think this article would affect those who are against the restrictions on 
violent TV content (pro-freedom)? (A greater numbers indicates stronger influence. 0 
means no influence.) 
More                   
Pro-freedom 
3 2 1 0 1 2 3 More                   
Pro-
restriction 
 
Section 5. This section is about your attitudes and behaviors towards the government 
restrictions on violent TV content.   
1. How do you think about the government restrictions on violent TV content in terms 
of wrong/right, negative/positive, unfavorable/favorable, unacceptable/acceptable, 
foolish/wise, and bad/good? (a “4” response reflects neutrality when comparing the two 
extremes of each pairing) 
1) wrong 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 right 
2) negative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 positive 
3) unfavorable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 favorable 
4) unacceptable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 acceptable 
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5) foolish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 wise 
6) bad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 good 
2.  Please indicate how much you agree with each of the following statements.  
1)  I would sign a petition for regulating violent television programming. 
Not support at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly support 
 2)  I would e-mail or call a television station or government agency to complain 
about violent content on television.  
Not support at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly support 
3)  I would say that violent content should be banned from television show during 
hours when children might be watching if I am asked for a survey on the issue.  
Not support at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly support 
3.  Please indicate how much you support each of the following statements.  
1)  Violent content should be banned from television show during hours when 
children might be watching.  
Not support at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly support 
2) Violent content should be banned from television show during any time of the day.  
Not support at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly support 
3) Violent content should be self-censored by broadcasting companies.  
Not support at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly support 
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Section 6. This section asks more questions about the news article that you read. 
1. The newspaper article made government restrictions on violent TV content seem 
likable/unlikable? A response of “-3” reflects that it was made to seem unlikable. A 
response of “3” indicates that it was made to seem likeable. 
unlikable -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3  likable 
2. The newspaper article made government restrictions on violent TV content seem 
good/bad? A response of “-3” reflects that it was made to seem bad. A response of “3” 
indicates that it was made to seem good. 
bad -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3  good 
3. Would you say that the news article was biased against or in favor of pro-restriction? 
A response of “0” reflects a neutral story. A response of “-3” indicates a very biased 
against pro-restriction story. A response of “3” indicates a very biased in favor of pro-
restriction story. 
against restrictions  -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3  in favor of 
restrictions 
4. Would you say that the writer of the article was biased against or in favor of pro-
restriction? A response of “0” reflects a neutral writer. A response of “-3” indicates very 
biased against pro-restriction. A response of “3” indicates very biased in favor of pro-
restriction. 
against restrictions -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3  in favor of 
restrictions 
5. Would you say that the newspaper that printed the article was biased against or in 
favor of pro-restriction? A response of “0” reflects a neutral newspaper. A response of 
“-3” indicates very biased against pro-restriction. A response of “3” indicates very 
biased in favor of pro-restriction. 
against restrictions -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3  in favor of 
restrictions 
6.  Regarding the opinion poll results, would you say that the results were biased 
against or in favor of the government restrictions on violent TV content? A response of 
“0” reflects neutral. A response of “-3” indicates very biased against pro-restriction. A 
response of “3” indicates very biased in favor of pro-restriction. 
against restrictions -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3  in favor of 
restrictions 
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Section 7.  Please indicate how much you agree with each of the following statements.  
1. Regulations trigger a sense of resistance in me.  
Not agree at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
2. When something is prohibited, I usually think ‘that’s exactly what I am going to do.  
Not agree at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
3. I become frustrated when I am unable to make free and independent decisions.  
Not agree at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
 
 
Thank you for completing the study. 
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Appendix B: Stimuli 
 
Anti-Restriction Article Without Threat Inducement 
 
Third Annual America's Poll 
 
Our exclusive poll finds 70% of Americans not ready to trade 
some cherished freedoms for greater safety for themselves -- and 
their children. 
 
By MICHAEL HASS 
 
More than ten years after the Columbine High School massacre in Colorado, would 
Americans accept new restrictions on violent TV content -- and surrender some 
freedoms -- to prevent another Columbine? No, that's not what a recent Boston Post poll 
has found. 
The scientific poll of 1,005 adults shows strong opposition around the nation, and 
across lines of sex and race, to strict regulation of violence on TV.  
"Censorship is a 19th-century concept that they are trying to apply to the 21st century," 
said Andrew Jay Schwartzman, executive director of the Media Access Project, a non-
profit organization. 
On the other hand, Julius Genachowski, chairman of the Federal Communications 
Commission, said "clearly, a record can be made that violent content on television is 
more dangerous than indecency."   
Nonetheless, poll respondents did not indicate willingness to impose government 
restrictions in return for safety for themselves and their children. 
Key findings  
• Restrictions of violent TV programming:  
70% was against banning violent content from television shows during hours 
when children might be watching.  
 
 
Copyright 2010 The Boston Post Company 
 
Privacy │ Policy │ Search │ Help │ Contact Us │ Site Map 
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Anti-Restriction Article With Threat Inducement 
 
Third Annual America's Poll 
 
Our exclusive poll finds 70% of Americans not ready to trade 
some cherished freedoms for greater safety for themselves -- and 
their children. 
 
By MICHAEL HASS 
 
More than ten years after the Columbine High School massacre in Colorado, would 
Americans accept new restrictions on violent TV content -- and surrender some 
freedoms -- to prevent another Columbine? No, that's not what a recent Boston Post poll 
has found. 
The scientific poll of 1,005 adults shows strong opposition around the nation, and 
across lines of sex and race, to strict regulation of violence on TV.  
"Censorship is a 19th-century concept that they are trying to apply to the 21st century," 
said Andrew Jay Schwartzman, executive director of the Media Access Project, a non-
profit organization. 
On the other hand, Julius Genachowski, chairman of the Federal Communications 
Commission, said "clearly, a record can be made that violent content on television is 
more dangerous than indecency."   
Nonetheless, poll respondents did not indicate willingness to impose government 
restrictions in return for safety for themselves and their children. 
Key findings  
• Restrictions of violent TV programming:  
70% was against banning violent content from television shows during hours 
when children might be watching.  
Recently, the Supreme Court struck down a law dealing with violent television 
programming and stated, "above all else, the First Amendment means that government 
has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, 
or its content."  As a result, Congress will not be able to move to limit violence on 
entertainment programs. TV shows with violence will keep on being seen during the 
prime time.    
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Pro-Restriction Article Without Threat Inducement 
Third Annual America's Poll 
Our exclusive poll finds 70% of Americans ready to trade some 
cherished freedoms for greater safety for themselves -- and their 
children. 
By MICHAEL HASS 
More than ten years after the Columbine High School massacre in Colorado, would 
Americans accept new restrictions on violent TV content -- and surrender some 
freedoms -- to prevent another Columbine? Yes, that's what a recent Boston Post poll 
has found. 
The scientific poll of 1,005 adults shows dramatic support around the nation, and across 
lines of sex and race, for strict regulation of violence on TV.  
"Clearly, a record can be made that violent content on television is more dangerous than 
indecency," said Julius Genachowski, chairman of the Federal Communications 
Commission. 
On the other hand, Andrew Jay Schwartzman, executive director of the Media Access 
Project, a non-profit organization, said, "Censorship is a 19th-century concept that they 
are trying to apply to the 21st century."  
Nonetheless, poll respondents indicated willingness to impose government restrictions 
in return for safety for themselves and their children. 
Key findings  
• Restrictions of violent TV programming:  
70% say violent content should be banned from television shows during hours when 
children might be watching.  
 
 
 
Copyright 2010 The Boston Post Company 
 
Privacy │ Policy │ Search │ Help │ Contact Us │ Site Map 
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Pro-Restriction Article With Threat Inducement 
 
Third Annual America's Poll 
Our exclusive poll finds 70% of Americans ready to trade some 
cherished freedoms for greater safety for themselves -- and their 
children. 
By MICHAEL HASS 
More than ten years after the Columbine High School massacre in Colorado, would 
Americans accept new restrictions on violent TV content -- and surrender some 
freedoms -- to prevent another Columbine? Yes, that's what a recent Boston Post poll 
has found. 
The scientific poll of 1,005 adults shows dramatic support around the nation, and across 
lines of sex and race, for strict regulation of violence on TV.  
"Clearly, a record can be made that violent content on television is more dangerous than 
indecency," said Julius Genachowski, chairman of the Federal Communications 
Commission. 
On the other hand, Andrew Jay Schwartzman, executive director of the Media Access 
Project, a non-profit organization, said, "Censorship is a 19th-century concept that they 
are trying to apply to the 21st century."  
Nonetheless, poll respondents indicated willingness to impose government restrictions 
in return for safety for themselves and their children. 
Key findings  
• Restrictions of violent TV programming:  
70% say violent content should be banned from television shows during hours when 
children might be watching.  
Concerned about an increase in violence on television, the Federal Communications 
Commission urged lawmakers to consider regulations that would restrict violent 
programs to late evening, when most children would not be watching. As a result, 
Congress will move to limit violence on entertainment programs by giving the agency 
the authority to define such content and restrict it to late evening television. Experts say 
you might not be able to watch your favorite TV shows, such as NCIS, during the prime 
time any more.  
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